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NEPAL’S ELECTION AND BEYOND  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nepal’s peace process faces a crucial test this month. 
Elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA) are likely 
to go ahead on 10 April 2008 as scheduled but political 
unrest and violence could mar – or even derail – 
preparations, and the aftermath could bring turbulence. 
Elections in a delicate post-conflict situation are never 
straightforward and Nepal has many possible flashpoints, 
not least that the two armies that fought the war remain 
intact, politically uncompromising and combat-ready. 
Once results are in, all political players must be prepared 
for a difficult period in which they will need to 
compromise to make the CA an effective body, extend 
the number of parties with a role in government and 
urgently tackle crucial issues left aside during the 
campaign, including security sector reform. The 
international community has an important election 
observation function and should listen to Nepal’s political 
and civil society groups in assessing the credibility of 
the process.  
Successful elections for a CA charged with writing a new 
constitution and serving as an interim legislature would 
be a major step forward. It would be a psychological 
and concrete achievement for the political leadership 
after two failed attempts that would vindicate the 
sometimes controversial concessions made to recalcitrant 
groups, which made the peace process possible. It would 
also be welcomed by the international community. India 
wants a successful conclusion to the roadmap it was 
closely involved in designing, while credible elections 
would open the way to a significant scaling back of the 
UN role. Although underlying issues remain, holding 
the polls would signal the short-term success of the 
recent deals with protesting groups. 
There are many positive signs. All parties moved quickly 
into campaign mode, nominating candidates and 
launching programs to attract voters. A vibrant media 
reporting news and offering critical scrutiny is narrowing 
the deficit in public awareness of the electoral system 
and party positions. Given the momentum, it would be 
hard for any major party to back out of the elections, 
although some, including the Maoists, are still wary of 
the process. 
Nevertheless, major challenges remain. The campaign 
has been dogged by violence and intimidation. While 
the Maoists appear to have been responsible for most 
assaults on rival candidates, they have had eight of their 
party workers killed – a fact which the mainstream 
media has chosen to downplay. Public security has been 
dismal throughout the ceasefire, and armed groups in 
the lowlands have carried out killings, bombings and 
abductions and threatened further violence. The 
considerable technical challenges of holding an election 
have been exacerbated by a complex, nearly opaque 
parallel electoral system that involves three separate 
means of selecting members of the CA. The widely 
respected Election Commission, charged with managing 
all aspects of the exercise, has no experience of logistics. 
In previous elections, those, along with back-up 
security, were managed by the army, which the peace 
agreement has now largely confined to barracks. 
The post-poll period will likely be difficult and 
dangerous. Under the best of circumstances, it will 
probably take three weeks to determine final results. 
Significant repolling is expected to be required in areas 
where there was violence or disruption on election day – 
adding weeks more to the schedule. There will certainly be 
appeals from losing parties, and public frustration at the 
delay in learning results may add to a tense atmosphere. 
Parties will trade allegations of fraud and violence. The 
behaviour of powerful losers will shape the immediate 
aftermath. Some, in particular the Maoists, may even 
be tempted to reject the entire election: the best possible 
results for them will not reflect their actual power on 
the ground (exercised through continuing parallel 
structures). Royalists cannot hope to gain enough seats 
to block the move towards a republic.  
If the major political forces accept the results and move 
forward without severe confrontation and acrimony, the 
transition will be manageable. However, each step will 
present obstacles that demand maturity and cooperation 
from party leaders. The formation of a new unity 
government – which will need to include members 
beyond the current seven-party coalition – will prompt 
much haggling. The convening of the CA, whose first 
sitting must take place within three weeks of final poll 
Nepal’s Election and Beyond 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 Page ii 
 
 
results and which is set to discard the monarchy, will 
be even more problematic. Transitional arrangements 
are only vaguely covered by the Interim Constitution; 
how they work out in practice will depend on political 
compromise. Yet, the CA will have to deal with tough 
issues, including the drafting of the constitution and 
addressing security sector reform, federalism, the role 
of the monarchy, secularism and inclusiveness. 
While attention has focused on the elections, there has 
been no progress on the fundamentals of the peace 
process. Many critical agreements have not been 
implemented, inter-party consensus and mutual trust 
are fragile, and the military ceasefire, which has held 
since April 2006, has yet to be transformed into structures 
for a sustainable peace. Public aspirations for peace and 
socio-economic reform remain high but are matched by 
scepticism towards political leaders. This is the best 
chance for politicians to redeem themselves.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Government of Nepal: 
1. Improve security so as to ensure an environment 
conducive to free and fair elections on 10 April 
2008 by: 
(a) providing solid guidance and political 
support to the Nepal Police and Armed 
Police Force, and training and deploying 
temporary police, ensuring they are non-
partisan and carry out their duties with 
neutrality;  
(b) improving security arrangements for 
candidates and party campaign workers; 
and 
(c) basing all security plans on local 
community support and respect for human 
rights. 
2. Build on the agreements with protesting groups by: 
(a) implementing fully the agreements with the 
United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) 
and the Federal Republican National Front; 
(b) pushing for negotiations with armed 
militant groups on an election ceasefire, 
while strengthening security in sensitive 
areas; and 
(c) encouraging moderate Madhesi leaders to 
use their influence to urge armed groups 
to drop plans to disrupt the polls. 
3. Guard against giving openings for Maoist People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Army (NA) 
militants to assert more influence over proceedings; 
clarify the code of conduct for both armies in the 
election period; and move urgently to begin 
discussions on security sector reform so the PLA 
has an incentive to remain in cantonments.  
4. Move beyond solely seven-party cooperation to 
involve all parties contesting the elections in 
discussions on security and the creation of a free 
and fair electoral environment.  
5. Keep working on other critical elements of the 
peace process and in particular: 
(a) implement the 23-point agreement and 
other accords; and 
(b) abide by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and ceasefire code of 
conduct.  
To the Election Commission of Nepal: 
6. Enforce the election code of conduct strictly and 
impartially, maintaining pressure on all parties to 
cease intimidation and other malpractice, such as 
the widespread misuse of state resources for 
campaigning.  
7. Continue with voter education and other publicity 
efforts and in particular prepare the public for 
potentially slow announcements of results by 
increased publicity explaining the count procedure 
and realistic timeframes.  
8. Make plans for dealing rapidly with politically 
sensitive post-election appeals and repolling. 
To National Election Observers: 
9. Carry out observation and reporting impartially and 
professionally, dismissing any observers who are 
linked to political parties and avoiding inflammatory 
assessments before and after the elections. 
To the Media: 
10. Adhere to the standards set out in the election 
Code of Conduct and exercise responsibility in the 
accurate and impartial reporting of election-related 
violence. 
To the Political Parties: 
11. Commit unambiguously to free and fair elections 
by: 
(a) promising to accept the results of a credible 
poll, whatever they may be; 
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(b) abiding by the election code of conduct, 
including ceasing all violence and 
intimidation; 
(c) exercising restraint and responsibility in 
mobilising student and youth cadres for 
legitimate election campaigning, not as 
private security forces; and 
(d) educating voters about the electoral system. 
12. Prepare for the difficult post-election period by 
building cross-party consensus on managing the 
transition, including: 
(a) forging a minimum agreement on dealing 
with post-election recriminations and 
maintaining consensus on moving forward; 
(b) using formal procedures to resolve any 
complaints regarding the election process 
or results; 
(c) agreeing on the broad framework for 
negotiations to form a new government; 
and 
(d) clarifying and publicising the procedure by 
which pre-election agreements, including 
the implementation of a federal democratic 
republic at the CA’s first sitting, will be 
implemented. 
13. Build common ground on procedural issues such as 
the formation of CA committees and the division 
of business between the CA as a constitution-
drafting body and as a legislature. 
14. Make clear commitments for public participation 
in the constitutional process. 
To the International Community, in particular 
India, China, U.S., EU and UN: 
15. Election observers should:  
(a) publicise international electoral standards 
and the principal benchmarks by which 
they will assess the polls, as well as 
explain the consequences of failure to 
meet those standards and benchmarks; 
(b) coordinate their deployment to maximise 
coverage across the country and make 
the most of relatively small numbers; and 
(c) coordinate on main statements to avoid 
public confusion and achieve as much 
unity as possible on the overall assessment. 
16. Condemn all election-related violence, pressure all 
parties to abide by the code of conduct and 
encourage the Election Commission and security 
forces to use their powers in a non-partisan manner. 
17. Prepare for the post-election period by: 
(a) reminding all parties they must accept 
the outcome; 
(b) supporting the Election Commission, 
politically and practically, on any necessary 
repolling; 
(c) urging and supporting the formation of a 
power-sharing unity government; and 
(d) listening to judgments by Nepali political 
and civil society groups in assessing the 
credibility of the electoral process. 
18. Offer technical and financial assistance for 
establishing mechanisms to ensure meaningful 
public participation in the constitutional process 
and work to coordinate proposed training and 
orientation programs for CA members. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 2 April 2008 
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NEPAL’S ELECTION AND BEYOND  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The December 2007 deal that brought the Maoists back 
into government and the February 2008 agreement to 
end a second Madhesi movement in the Tarai plains 
put Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) elections back 
on track.1 The seven-party governing coalition remains 
at loggerheads on many issues, but all its components 
insist they want the elections to go ahead as scheduled 
on 10 April 2008.2 
The country has considerable experience of elections. 
Following the first general elections in 1959, the 
Panchayat period of palace rule offered little chance 
for meaningful polls, and a 1980 referendum on the 
Panchayat system was widely seen as rigged. But 1991 
multiparty elections managed a smooth transition to 
democratic rule. The general elections of that year as 
well as 1994 and 1999 were regarded as broadly free 
and fair (despite local malpractices by most parties), 
were well managed considering the logistical challenges, 
 
 
1 On the impasse before the 23 December 2007 agreement, 
see Crisis Group Asia Briefing Nº72, Nepal: Peace Postponed, 
18 December 2007. Other recent Crisis Group reporting on 
Nepal includes Asia Briefing Nº68, Nepal’s Fragile Peace 
Process, 28 September 2007; and Asia Reports N°136, Nepal’s 
Troubled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007; N°132, Nepal’s Maoists: 
Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007; and N°128, Nepal’s 
Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. Nepali translations 
are available at www.crisisgroup.org. Useful online sources of 
election-related information include: Election Commission of 
Nepal (www.election.gov.np); the UN mission (UNMIN) elections 
page (www.unmin.org.np/?d=peaceprocess&p= election); and 
Nepal Election Portal (www.nepalelection portal.org). 
2 In this report, the term “seven parties” refers to the governing 
coalition of six parliamentary parties and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist, CPN(M)). The “six parties” are the 
continuation of the Seven-Party Alliance, whose membership 
was reduced when the Nepali Congress and Nepali Congress 
(Democratic) reunited. Past Crisis Group reporting referred 
to this alliance as the SPA, a term that is now widely used to 
refer to the six plus the CPN(M) – although there is no 
“alliance” binding them. The six parties are the Nepali 
Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, NSP 
(A)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers and Peasants Party 
(NWPP); and United Left Front (ULF). 
and had high turnouts.3 This is, however, the first time 
Nepalis will elect a constitution-drafting body, though 
calls for such an assembly go back to the early 1950s.4 
Most parties are treating the campaign in the same 
manner as past general elections. This is encouraging 
insofar as it suggests a return to normality but indicates 
they are underplaying the significantly different role a 
CA will play – even though it will also function as a 
legislature. The sense of comfort is likewise fragile. The 
momentum to hold the polls appears unstoppable, but 
last-minute hurdles could still delay or derail the process, 
especially if major players become more worried about 
the likely results. 
 
 
3 Voter turnout was 65.15 per cent in 1991, 61.86 per cent in 
1994 and 65.79 per cent in 1999, Election Commission at 
www.election.gov.np/EN/prevelection.html. 
4 On the history of the constituent assembly proposal, see Crisis 
Group Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: 
The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005, pp. 36-38; on its 
November 2005 adoption by the mainstream-Maoist alliance, 
see Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005. 
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II. THE RUN-UP 
A. HOW THE ELECTIONS WERE PUT BACK 
ON TRACK 
By December 2007 the peace process was at an impasse. 
The Maoists walked out of the interim government on 
18 September when new demands were not met by the 
other parties.5 Negotiations on a deal to bring them back 
into government and set another date for the twice-
delayed elections were stalled until a flurry of talks 
achieved success on 23 December. 
The 23-point agreement between the six governing 
parties and the Maoists addressed the main issues, 
committing to making Nepal a federal democratic 
republic as soon as the CA convenes and to implementing 
still incomplete aspects of the peace process.6 A third 
amendment to the Interim Constitution (IC) on 28 
December reflected the new commitments, most notably 
the implementation of the republic at the CA’s first 
sitting, an increase in the number of CA seats to be 
elected by proportional representation (PR) and 
clarification that the king no longer has any powers, 
and the prime minister will officiate as head of state 
until the republic is implemented.7 The Maoists rejoined 
the government on 30 December, with their previous 
five ministerial positions and two additional state 
ministers.8 The 10 April election date was announced 
on 11 January 2008. 
The road forward was not smooth. The Madhesi 
Janadhikar Forum (MJF), which had spearheaded the 
Madhesi movement of January-February 2007, was 
joined in December 2007 by Rajendra Mahato’s 
 
 
5 On these demands and the walkout, see Crisis Group 
Briefing, Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, op. cit. 
6 The 23-point agreement is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/ 
keydocs/2007-12-24-23.Point.Agreement.SPA.NEP.pdf; an 
unofficial English translation is at http://www.unmin.org.np/ 
downloads/keydocs/2007-12-24-23.Point.Agreement.SPA.ENG. 
pdf. 
7 Interim Constitution, Art. 159. A bilingual edition of the 
Interim Constitution has been published by the UN Development 
Programme (the Nepali original is authoritative) and is at 
www.undp.org.np/constitutionbuilding/constitutionnepal/con
stitutionfile/Interim_Constitution_bilingual.pdf. 
8 The CPN(M) ministers are Krishna Bahadur Mahara 
(information and communications); Dev Gurung (local 
development); Matrika Yadav (forest and soil conservation); 
Hisila Yami (physical planning and infrastructure); and 
Pampha Bhusal (women, children and social welfare). State 
ministers are Nabin Kumar Biswokarma (women, children 
and social welfare) and Padam Rai (local development). 
Sadbhavana Party (which had split from the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi), NSP(A), which 
remained in the government) and a new party, the 
Tarai Madhesi Democratic Party (TMDP), established 
by former Nepali Congress (NC) minister Mahant 
Thakur. These three parties formed a loose alliance, 
the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which 
launched a new wave of protests from 19 January 2008 
and an indefinite Tarai bandh (shutdown) from 13 
February, demanding greater representation in the CA 
polls and a single Madhesi federal state. Some of the 
protests were provocative, even violent (one armed 
police officer was killed); a harsh state response led to 
the deaths of six protestors.9 Although the shutdown hit 
the country hard, producing shortages and price-hikes 
in Kathmandu, it was not sufficient to disrupt the 
nomination of candidates for the elections. With both 
sides under pressure to negotiate, India stepped in to 
take a surprisingly public mediation role, hosting some 
critical talks in its embassy. 
After frantic last-minute haggling during which MJF 
leader Upendra Yadav threatened to pull out, the 
government and the UDMF signed an eight-point 
agreement on 28 February.10 The deal was enough to 
call off the protests, and there were both victory rallies 
and widespread relief in Tarai towns. However, its 
content was vague, and it was not clear that either side 
had made serious concessions other than to allow 
election preparations to go ahead. Thanks to a deadline 
extension by the Election Commission, the Madhesi 
parties filed nominations, as did former royalist Prime 
Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa’s Rashtriya Janashakti 
Party (RJP), which had threatened a boycott if the Tarai 
issue was not resolved. 
Madhesis were not the only determined protestors. A 
coalition of hill and Tarai ethnic groups had formed a 
Federal Republican National Front (FRNF), which also 
called strikes and threatened to disrupt the elections.11 
Three days after the Madhes deal, the government 
 
 
9 See “Summary of human rights concerns arising from the 
Terai protests of 13-29 February 2008”, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal, Kathmandu, 27 
March 2008. 
10 The eight-point agreement is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads 
/keydocs/2008-02-28- Agreement.SPA.Govt.UDMF.NEP. pdf; 
an unofficial English translation is at http://www.unmin.org. 
np/downloads/keydocs/2008-02-28-Agreement.SPA.Govt.UD 
MF.ENG.pdf. 
11 The FRNF brings together the Federal Limbuwan State 
Council (Lingden) and the Tamangsaling Autonomous State 
Council (which had already united as the Federal Democratic 
National Forum), the United Tharu National Front, Madheshi 
People’s Rights Forum (Biswas/Gupta), Dalit Janajati Party, 
Loktantrik Madheshi Morcha and Madheshi Loktantrik Morcha. 
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concluded a five-point agreement with the FRNF, which 
brought an end to its protests, by promising a federal 
republic that would emphasise the rights of ethnic groups 
and guarantee their proportional representation in all 
branches of the state.12 
Elections once more appeared possible, but the 
agreements that cleared the way were reached under 
great external pressure, and their durability has been 
in question from the start. Some of the seven parties 
themselves were quick to repudiate the eight-point 
agreement, while the Nepal Army (NA) insisted it would 
not accept group Madhesi recruitment. Other elements 
may or may not materialise. A sceptical observer 
commented: “You have a government that can’t provide 
electricity or collect rubbish promising the details of a 
federal system that’s yet to be agreed upon”.13 There 
has been almost no progress on the fundamentals of 
the peace process, including implementation of the 
23-point agreement. Seven-party consensus is fragile 
and relations often antagonistic.  
B. PARTIES AND ALLIANCES 
1. Manifestos and party positioning 
The parties moved rapidly into election mode. The 
Maoists were the first to start mass training to prepare 
their activists for the campaign, but others quickly 
followed, building on their interrupted preparations for 
the postponed November 2007 polls. The Maoists were 
also the first of the major parties to publish their 
manifesto, on 7 March, quickly followed by the 
Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) 
on 9 March and the NC on 13 March. 
The major parties’ manifestos follow similar patterns. 
Each starts with a lengthy analysis of recent history, and 
each claims the party is best placed to fulfil the mandate 
of the April 2006 people’s movement. Each stresses 
the significance of the constitution-writing process – 
the NC, for example, stating that it is the chance to 
create a new sense of “we, the people of Nepal”14 – but 
large parts of the NC and UML manifestos read more 
like a standard plan for government. No party devotes 
much attention to explaining the electoral system, setting 
out plans for the functioning of the CA or ensuring public 
 
 
12 The five-point government-FRNF agreement is at www.un 
min.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03-02-Agreement. SPA. 
Govt.FRNF.NEP.pdf; an unofficial English translation is at 
www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-03-02-Agreement. 
SPA.Govt.FRNF.ENG.pdf. 
13 Crisis Group interview, international expert, 9 March 2008. 
14 NC manifesto, p. 4. 
participation in the process. However, the Maoists offer 
more detail than the others in most areas relevant to the 
CA, notably a proposed map of ethnic-based autonomous 
states. Key features of the manifestos include: 
Nepali Congress. The NC stresses the party’s 
longstanding commitment to liberal multiparty democracy 
and reminds voters that in 1950 it was the first to call for 
an elected assembly to frame a constitution. It urges a 
broadly Westminster/Indian government structure, with 
an upper and lower house, a prime minister-led 
government and a ceremonial president. 
CPN(UML). The UML sees the CA’s main objectives 
as democracy, lasting peace and progressive policies 
and stresses its own history of struggle and determination 
to bring change. Although it talks of the need for 
consensus in the CA, it appeals for votes to ensure it 
leads the next government, which it says will be formed 
according to the proportion of seats won by each party 
and will “play an important role in the constitution-
making process”.15 It calls for a directly-elected prime 
minister to head the executive and a ceremonial president. 
CPN(Maoist). The Maoists are most emphatic in 
reminding voters that “the election of a constituent 
assembly is not the same as the usual five-yearly 
parliamentary elections”.16 They devote eleven pages 
to an analysis of Nepal’s historic problems (feudalism 
and imperialism), the democratic movement as a fusion 
of their people’s war and the people’s movement, the 
regressive conspiracies of the feudal monarchy and the 
weaknesses of the parliamentary parties in comparison 
to the clarity and conviction of the Maoist revolutionaries. 
The CPN(M) personalises its appeal by highlighting 
the claim of its leader, Prachanda, to the executive 
presidency of a new, republican Nepal. It argues that 
as the only party to put forward the new agenda of a 
republic and state restructuring, it is the only one that 
can be trusted to implement that agenda.17 In many 
policy areas, the Maoists offer compromise, such as 
embracing public-private partnership,18 and they make 
the kind of promises associated with a parliamentary 
election, such as eradicating illiteracy and ensuring 
clean drinking water for all within five years.19 
Smaller leftist parties. Janamorcha Nepal has proposed 
a balance of power between an executive president and 
 
 
15 UML manifesto, p. 38. 
16 CPN(M) commitmentpPaper, p. 7. 
17 Ibid, p. 37. 
18 Ibid, p. 25. Maoist leaders stress that this is part of their 
“New Transitional Economic Policy” and does not reflect 
any weakening of long-term commitment to socialism, Crisis 
Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, 14 March 2008. 
19 CPN(M) commitment paper, p. 29. 
Nepal’s Election and Beyond  
Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 Page 4 
 
 
a prime minister, the former to be directly elected and 
the latter to be chosen by the upper and lower houses of 
parliament. It also calls for halting commercialisation of 
the education sector. The Nepal Workers and Peasants’ 
Party (NWPP) has called for a powerful president, with 
no prime minister and proposes to convert the existing 
geographically delimited zones into provinces with 
legislatures, rather than divisive forms of federalism.20 
CPN(ML), another small communist party, has proposed 
a directly elected prime minister, a ceremonial president 
appointed by the parliament and seven federal states. The 
CPN (United) has one unique proposition: equally 
powerful parliaments at the central and provincial level. 
Madhesi parties. The TMDP still calls for a single, 
autonomous Madhesi province across the entire Tarai. 
A prime minister would hold executive power and a ban 
is proposed on no-confidence motions for one year to 
ensure “political stability”. The MJF wants a president 
as chief executive, continues to demand Madhesi group 
recruitment into the army and proposes a trilingual official 
language policy (local mother tongues, Nepali and Hindi), 
with English as the national language. The Sadbhavana 
Party led by Rajendra Mahato calls for a prime minister-
led government with a ceremonial president, elected 
provincial and central legislatures and autonomous 
provinces ruled by chief ministers. Madhesi leader Ramraja 
Prasad Singh’s Navajanabadi Morcha has proposed a 
rotating presidency shared between incumbents from the 
hill, mountain and Tarai regions.21 
Royalist parties. Only the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
(Nepal), the RPP(N), headed by the king’s former home 
minister, Kamal Thapa, is campaigning on an explicitly 
monarchist platform, demanding that the future of the 
monarchy be decided by a referendum and calling for 
its continuation as a constitutional entity. The Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP) and the Rashtriya Janashakti 
Party (RJP) are more ambivalent towards the palace; 
both have publicly stated, though not in their manifestos, 
that they will accept the CA vote as legitimate authority 
for determining the monarchy’s future. The RJP 
explicitly calls for the constitution drafted by the CA 
to be “directly ratified by the people”; the RPP says 
“people” should decide the future of the monarchy with 
“their direct participation”.22 It does, however, embrace 
the concept of federalism and calls for an ethnically 
based upper house. The RPP’s manifesto is silent on the 
monarchy and calls for state restructuring to guarantee 
 
 
20 It also called for separate national and provincial citizenship, 
compulsory army training and a ban on foreign bank accounts. 
21 “Nawa Janabadi Morcha unveils manifesto”, The Rising 
Nepal, 17 March 2008. 
22 RJP and RPP manifestos. 
“inclusive multiparty democracy”, with federal states 
run by chief ministers. 
2. Candidates 
Candidate selection was a major challenge for the parties. 
The distribution of party tickets is always a contested 
affair; because of the parallel electoral system and the 
new quotas for various communities, it became even 
harder, especially for the larger parliamentary parties, 
whose leaders had to juggle the expectations of their 
many established workers and incumbent parliamentarians 
with the need to offer the electorate new faces. 
The NC has a high proportion of older candidates, many 
the same ones active in every election since 1991. Of 
its first-past-the-post (FPTP) candidates, the youngest 
is 31, most (175) are between 41 and 59 and 44 are 60 
or above; the UML is only slightly different.23 In contrast, 
the CPN(M) has a young profile, with an average age for 
its FPTP candidates of 39.24 The Maoists also present 
by far the most diverse selection of FPTP candidates, 
with eleven Dalits, 73 janajatis and 63 Madhesis. The 
UML and the NC field the bare minimum of women 
candidates, only 26 each for 240 FPTP seats.25 Many 
of these have been selected for seats which they have 
little chance of winning. In sixteen districts and 67 
constituencies, there is not a single woman candidate.26 
The Maoists have nominated 42 women, as well as 
several serving members of their People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), in contravention of the peace agreement.27 
The Madhesi parties have opted largely for middle- and 
higher-caste candidates. The MJF, for example, has 25 
Yadavs and almost no women. The TMDP has four 
women out of 94 FPTP candidates, the Sadbhavana 
Party four out of 87 and the MJF three out of 103. 
3. Alliances 
Despite the multitude of parties, there is still a broadly 
discernible left-right split. The leftist parties are the 
Maoists, UML, the Janamorcha, NWPP and CPN(ML), 
 
 
23 Only ten UML candidates are over 60; 52 are between 29 
and 40 and 121 between 41 and 50. For an assessment of youth 
issues and representation see Dipendra Tamang, “Youth 
Representation In CA”, The Rising Nepal, 10 March 2008. 
24 45 candidates are less than 30; 101 candidates are between 
31 and 40 and 60 between 41 and 50. 
25 On the various quotas, see Section III below. 
26 “16 jilla ra 67 kshetrama mahila ummedavar shunya”, 
Naya Patrika, 24 March 2008. 
27 See “Election Report No. 1”, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 22 March 
2008, at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/publications/2008-
03-22-UNMIN.Election.Report.1.ENG.pdf. 
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as well as a handful of smaller groups. Those towards 
the right are the NC (although it describes itself as 
socialist), the royalists and the various Madhesi parties, 
which are all more or less anti-leftist. However, there 
are other ways of categorising the parties: in many ways 
UML and NC similarities as centrist parliamentary 
parties outweigh their differences. 
The major parties have been expected to agree on a seat-
sharing deal under which their top leaders would be 
elected without serious opposition, but they are reluctant 
to discuss this publicly and have sent mixed signals 
about it. An arrangement would concern the FPTP 
portion of the elections, in which candidates can in 
effect withdraw to allow their opponents a clear run (it is 
too late for them to cancel their candidacies formally, 
so any deal must be well publicised to voters).28 Even 
if party leaders overcome their mutual antagonism to 
reach such an accommodation, however, it may be 
difficult to ensure that local activists and candidates 
respect it. 
On the left, Janamorcha has withdrawn some candidates 
in the interest of unity (for example, pulling out of 
Madhav Nepal’s Kathmandu constituency), but the 
larger parties are still at loggerheads. The Maoists have 
pushed hard for a left alliance and called for a grand 
alliance of progressive and nationalist forces.29 Sceptics 
suggest this stems from concern they would not do well 
on their own. The Maoists themselves argue that there 
have been longstanding agreements to unite around a 
common minimum program, and a broad alliance is 
particularly appropriate for CA elections, which should 
be different from the usual scramble for parliamentary 
power.30 They have reacted to the UML’s reluctance 
to forge such an alliance by accusing it of betrayal under 
outside pressure. Domestic and international forces 
 
 
28 In most constituencies in which senior leaders are standing, 
opposing parties have fielded weaker candidates. For example: 
Maoists chair Prachanda will be facing a second-rung UML 
leader, Sanu Maharjan, and the unknown Rajan K.C. from 
NC. Local alliances have formed in many parts of the 
country, mostly between the leftist parties. 
29 For example, Prachanda repeated the call for such an alliance 
the day after the CPN(M) launched its manifesto. “Prachanda 
says ‘nationalists’ and republicans should join forces in polls”, 
nepalnews.com, 8 March 2008. 
30 The CPA specifies a common minimum program for the 
interim government, but this does not apply to electoral 
arrangements or constitutional deliberations: “The conduct of 
business of the Government of Nepal shall be carried out 
consistently with the aspirations of the united people's 
movement, political consensus and culture of mutual 
cooperation. The common minimum programme prepared 
through mutual agreement shall be the basis of the policies of 
the Government of Nepal”, CPA, Art. 43(1). 
have indeed leaned on the UML to dissuade it from 
joining with the Maoists, but the party’s reluctance also 
stems from confidence it can do well on its own. It 
has generally left it to local party leaders to decide on 
cooperation but has not closed the door altogether on a 
nationwide deal.31 Holding out the prospect of an alliance 
may be the UML’s attempt to keep Maoist attacks on 
its activists in check: the rash of violence after it had 
initially refused a deal suggested a deliberate Maoist 
response. 
Madhesi parties united to form the UDMF but have been 
divided over their election plans. Although they are not 
intensively contesting each other in some constituencies, 
they could not agree on a functional alliance. The 
Sadbhavana Party and TMDP did eventually manage 
a deal, but the more prominent MJF has not joined them. 
Their divisions may cost them dearly. Analysts suspect 
they will not win more than 50 seats among them, which 
would mean that most Madhesi delegates will belong to 
the major parties.32 On the royalist front, the RJP and 
RPP have avoided fielding candidates against each other 
but face competition with Kamal Thapa’s RPP(N). 
C. BEYOND THE PARTIES 
The public. The general public want elections but doubt 
politicians’ sincerity or ability to make them happen, 
though the recent momentum has assuaged some doubts. 
If intimidation – already a problem in some areas – at 
least does not increase, turnout could be high. The 
incumbent parties should all be worried that the interim 
government’s dismal record on basic services will count 
against them: little has been done to ensure security, 
deliver basic services and utilities or cushion significant 
price rises for food and petroleum products. However, 
dissatisfaction on these matters is unlikely to generate 
major street protests or stimulate an election boycott. 
The media. The increasingly sophisticated media has 
already played a major role by both disseminating basic 
election information and scrutinising parties and 
candidates critically. The press has analysed party lists, 
exposed malpractices such as dummy candidates and 
offered a vehicle for policies to be communicated and 
debated. The significance of private FM radio and 
television stations has grown hugely (they hardly existed 
in 1999, at the time of the last elections). In addition 
 
 
31 Crisis Group interviews, UML and CPN(M) central 
leaders and district activists, March 2008. See also “UML 
chief rules out possibility of alliance with Maoists at the 
centre”, nepalnews.com, 9 March 2008. 
32 See, for example, Prashant Jha, “Murkier and murkier”, 
Nepali Times, 21 March 2008. 
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to carrying donor-funded, election-related programs, 
they have developed their own high-quality discussion 
and interview shows. State radio and television have 
also shown greater professionalism. However, there 
are questions about their impartiality, since the Maoists 
run the information and communications ministry. 
Equally, there are questions about the political inclinations 
of the private media, most of which have been quick 
to castigate Maoist misbehaviour but softer on other 
parties, especially the NC.  
Overall, the media has had trouble adjusting its outlook 
and coverage to the delicate transitional situation. Much 
election reporting has been along traditional party lines and 
has downplayed or ignored the additional sensitivities 
of the conflict context. The media is subject to a code of 
conduct in the electoral period (in force since 9 March 
2008),33 the observance of which is being monitored by 
the Nepal Press Council. This government-appointed 
watchdog has yet to show signs of being a stern referee, 
despite much inflammatory and inaccurate reporting. 
Civil society. Its leaders resent accusations that civil 
society has become divided and partisan, no longer 
commanding its earlier respect or influence. “Remember 
we dragged the parties to where they are today”, one 
said. “If we hadn’t, there would never have been a 
people’s movement or peace process”.34 Civil society’s 
active role has helped move the peace process forward, 
but criticisms of partisanship and personal rivalry are 
not unfounded. Many human rights organisations and 
election observers (see below) have party leanings. Some 
prominent activists are campaigning for parties or even 
standing for election, for example, Daman Nath 
Dhungana, who has returned to the NC. Nevertheless, 
influential civil society voices are maintaining some 
pressure on the parties to abide by electoral norms and 
deliver the results the peace process promised. Many 
who lack party leanings are disillusioned at the speed 
with which the parties have returned to business as 
usual, with only the Maoists willing to nominate some 
outside individuals. 
 
 
33 What is often referred to as “the media code of conduct” is 
actually Part 4 of the general election Code of Conduct issued 
by the Election Commission, at www.election.gov.np/NP/ 
electioncode/index.php. An unofficial English translation is 
at www.nepalmonitor. com/2008/02/ecs_nepal_media_code_ 
of_conduct_during_ca_elections-print.html. 
34 Crisis Group interview, civil society leader, Kathmandu, 
13 March 2008. 
D. A CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT? 
Despite the positive mood generated by the momentum 
towards elections, there are clear signs that not only 
the campaign but also its aftermath will be fraught with 
tension. For all the rhetoric of uniting to build a new 
Nepal, most parties are preparing for aggressive 
competition. On 1 April, leaders of the three main parties 
signed a ten-point pact promising to cease misconduct and 
establishing monitoring and coordination mechanisms to 
build a free and fair environment.35 However, past 
evidence suggests that signatures on paper do not readily 
translate into improved behaviour. 
There have been at least nine election-related murders: 
one victim a National People’s Front candidate in Banke, 
all the others Maoist activists.36 On 29 March, two 
people died when a Biratnagar mosque was bombed, 
an act for which the shadowy Nepal Defence Army 
claimed responsibility. There have also been dozens 
of assaults on party workers engaged in campaign 
activities. RPP Chair Pashupati Shamsher Rana 
commented: “This will not be an election, it’s a battle”.37 
Maoist leaders have described the elections as the next 
stage in their “war” for revolutionary transformation.38 
Domestic and international human rights bodies and 
observers have warned of misconduct and condemned 
the killings and other acts of violence and intimidation.39 
The Maoists have been accused of the most systematic 
misconduct, in particular a series of attacks on royalist 
party workers and apparently concerted efforts to disrupt 
their campaigns. In pre-poll observation, the respected 
but UML-linked human rights organisation INSEC 
reported Maoists were responsible for 97 per cent of 
 
 
35 An unofficial English translation of the ten-point agreement 
is at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2008-04-01-10. 
Point.Agreement.NC.UML.CPNM.ENG.pdf 
36 The mainstream media has paid little attention to the killing 
of Maoist workers. On the seven deaths, see “Ek mahinama 
sat maobadiko hatya”, Naya Patrika, 23 March 2008. 
37 Crisis Group interview, RPP Chair Pashupati Shamsher 
Rana, Kathmandu, 14 March 2008. 
38 Prachanda, election campaign address, Kirtipur, 12 March 
2008. The CPN(M)’s internal handbook for party workers 
includes instructions on election preparations from the chief of 
its schooling department. The main elements are: political and 
ideological preparation; organisational preparation; technical 
preparation; and preparation for retaliation. Dharmendra Bastola, 
“Samvidhansabhako chunav ra char tayariko prashna”, CPN(M) 
schooling department, 2008. 
39 For example, see “OHCHR-Nepal calls on political actors 
to ensure respect for human rights in CA elections”, Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal, press 
release, Kathmandu, 14 March 2008. 
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violations of the code of conduct.40 As well as beatings 
and harassment, there have been a few abductions. The 
aggressive language of party leaders may well encourage 
cadres to this course. All major parties plan to mobilise 
their youth wings to support door-to-door canvassing 
and be present at polling booths; they will likely also 
serve, as in the past, as muscle to protect candidates or 
threaten voters. In the words of the RPP chair, “the state 
isn’t able to provide adequate security, so each party 
will try to make their own private arrangements”.41 
Candidates, their party colleagues and election officials 
may face the most direct threats, but intimidation of 
the general public could be as damaging. Many Tarai 
districts have no-go areas for some candidates, and the 
threat of armed action remains explicit. The continued 
absence of local government officials suggests a far from 
normal atmosphere, which may be off-putting to election 
and security officials.42 International experts warn that 
policing plans do little to restore public confidence.43 
Voter participation in past general elections has 
consistently been over 60 per cent (66 per cent in the 
most recent). If turnout for the CA polls is significantly 
lower – whether through fear or disinterest – it could 
undermine the legitimacy of the exercise. Low turnout 
in particular areas, or partial boycotts, could spark 
renewed regional tensions. The main threat to wide 
participation is intimidation. In the face of direct threats 
from Madhesi militant groups and indirect warnings from 
the Maoists (and sometimes other parties), many voters 
may decide to stay at home. Poor turnout could have 
specific electoral ramifications: for example, harming 
the traditional NC vote, since older voters with family 
and property to worry about may be more influenced 
by threats. On the other hand, low youth participation 
– possible since many young men work abroad or away 
from their home constituencies,44 and several thousand 
 
 
40 Crisis Group interview, Subodh Pyakurel, INSEC, 21 March 
2008. The Code of Conduct is available (in Nepali only) at 
www.election.gov.np/NP/electioncode/index.php. 
41 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 14 March 2008. 
42 For example, the Democracy and Election Alliance Nepal 
(DEAN) reported that 23 Tarai constituencies are acutely fearful 
of elections; two (Dang-5 and Mahottari-5) are off limits to 
election observers, social workers and even parties. Crisis 
Group interview, Subhadayak Shah, DEAN, 21 March 2008. 
43 See “Public safety and policing in Nepal: an analysis of 
public attitudes towards community safety and policing across 
Nepal”, Saferworld, January 2008, at www.saferworld.org.uk/ 
images/pubdocs/Policing_in_ Nepal_English.pdf. 
44 For example, an estimated 25,000 registered voters in the 
western district of Myagdi alone are away from home (mainly 
working overseas) and unable to vote. “25,000 to miss polls 
in Myagdi”, The Himalayan Times, 26 March 2008. 
young adults are missing from the electoral roll45 – 
could harm the Maoists. 
E. POSSIBLE SPOILERS 
Armed militant groups. Several Tarai-based groups 
threaten to disrupt the elections and have already carried 
out violence, but they are more politically isolated than 
before: people are tired of bloodshed and keen for elections. 
They also face a more serious security crackdown, with 
both deployment of additional armed police (APF) in 
sensitive districts and tougher cross-border controls.46 
Despite encouraging signals from some ministers, Prime 
Minister Koirala seemed to close the door on 
negotiations;47 however, Peace and Reconstruction 
Minister Ramchandra Poudel wrote to armed groups 
on 21 March inviting talks.48 There were hopes they 
could agree to at least a ceasefire, but on 29 March the 
groups that had indicated a willingness to negotiate 
announced they would not talk, as the government 
had failed to meet their preconditions. They could 
disrupt the polls – attacks on election officials could 
prompt widespread fear and lead to some deserting their 
posts, a pattern seen with local government officials – 
but are unlikely to derail them entirely. Apart from 
the armed groups with political agendas, the 
numerous criminal gangs could take advantage of the 
election situation or be used by other forces for 
disruption. 
Maoists. The Maoists’ public enthusiasm for the 
elections seems at odds with near universal expectations 
that they will fare poorly in them. Some suspect they may 
try to postpone the vote at the last minute if they are 
convinced they will do badly; there are signs they plan to 
re-evaluate their policy a few days before the polls. They 
could easily make elections impossible but only if they 
were willing to sacrifice their credibility, domestically 
and internationally. Few would forgive them if they were 
 
 
45 Only those who reached eighteen by 15 December 2006 
are on the roll. See Section III C(1) below. 
46 India has promised to do more to crack down on cross-border 
crime and the activities of armed groups. There has been more 
progress on the Uttar Pradesh-Nepal border than on the (more 
sensitive) Bihar-Nepal border. Neither Indian state government 
is led by parties represented in the central government, and it 
is likely border security efforts will be inconsistent. See also 
“India won't tolerate activities that can affect polls: Indian 
envoy”, nepalnews.com, 18 March 2008. 
47 Binod Bhandari and Lila Ballav Ghimire, “No talks with armed 
groups before polls: PM”, The Kathmandu Post, 10 March 2008. 
48 “Sashastra samuhalai vartanimti patrachar”, Gorkhapatra, 
22 March 2008. The groups invited were the Madhesi Mukti 
Tigers, United Tarai Janatantrik Morcha (formerly the JTMM(G)), 
JTMM(J) and Tarai Cobras. 
Nepal’s Election and Beyond  
Crisis Group Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 Page 8 
 
 
seen to be undermining the process. Although some 
within the party would shrug off public condemnation, 
the leadership would be unlikely to risk it. 
Royalists. Politicians close to the palace insist that only 
the Maoists are likely to cause trouble. “No one else 
will try to disrupt the polls”, said former prime minister 
and RJP leader Surya Bahadur Thapa.49 However, most 
observers – including some sympathetic to the king – 
suspect ardent monarchists are unlikely to accept the 
elections with equanimity and may try to stall the process. 
If the polls go ahead, parties formally committed to a 
republic are certain to win a majority, an unsettling 
prospect for royalists. Maoist leaders speak of palace 
conspiracies and say they have reliable information some 
are planning violence, including assassinations.50 Still, 
chances of halting the process are slim. “What can the 
king do?” asked one political analyst. “He could sponsor 
a major destabilising incident such as a bombing or 
instigate or take advantage of other tensions, unrest or 
public disorder – but none of these is likely to halt the 
polls altogether”.51  
Other factors. Lack of will in the major parties was a 
major cause of past delays and could still be a problem 
if the NC or UML feared crushing defeat. This does not 
appear likely, although any rise in Maoist intimidation 
or serious evidence of attempts at widespread rigging 
could change the picture. UDMF members may worry 
that their prospects are poor but would find it hard to 
back out or cause disruption now that they have signed a 
deal. Technical and logistical challenges are probably 
likelier than that individual parties will back out, 
although these could be seized on as an excuse for 
postponement by the nervous. 
 
 
49 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 16 March 2008. 
50 Prachanda, public address in Kirtipur, 12 March 2008. 
Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, 14 March 2008. 
51 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
III. THE ELECTIONS 
A. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
The electoral system is a parallel one, with first-past-
the-post (FPTP) and, for the first time, proportional 
representation (PR) contests.52 Voters will elect 240 
members of the constituent assembly in direct, 
constituency-based FPTP contests and 335 through 
party list-based PR ones. The interim cabinet will 
nominate a further 26 members by consensus.53 The 
total of 601 seats is greater than was originally envisaged 
(and far more than the 205 seats of past elected 
parliaments). This resulted from demands for greater 
representation in the Tarai and more weighting to the 
PR contest. There are 9,788 polling centres, with one to 
three booths each, a total of 20,866 polling booths. 
The FPTP contest is simple: in each constituency, the 
candidate with the most votes wins. There are 3,954 
registered candidates from 55 parties for the 240 FPTP 
seats.54 The whole country is a single constituency for the 
PR contest, in which voters will vote for parties, each 
of which must have registered a list of at least 34 
 
 
52 The main electoral legislation includes the Election 
Commission Act 2063 (2006); Election (Offences and 
Punishment) Act, 2063 (2007); Election to the Members of the 
Constituent Assembly Act, 2064 (2007); Act relating to Electoral 
Rolls, 2063 (2006); Rules relating to Electoral Rolls, 2063 (2006); 
Rules Relating to Electoral Rolls, 2063(2007); Constituent 
Assembly Court Act 2064 (2007); Political Party Registration 
(for the purpose of Election) Regulation 2063 (2006); Regulation 
relating to the Election to the Members of the Constituent 
Assembly, 2064 (2007); as well as various policies and 
directives. The acts and regulations are available (mostly in 
Nepali and English tranlsation) at the Election Commission 
website, www.election.gov.np. A useful summary of the legal 
framework governing elections is available at www.nepal 
electionportal.org/EN/election-laws/. The Constitutional Advisory 
Support Unit (CASU) of UNDP has made available a selection of 
Interim Constitution provisions relevant to the CA (although it 
does not take account of the third amendment), at 
www.undp.org.np/constitutionbuilding/elibrary/constitutionn
epal/IC%20CA%20Provisions.pdf. 
53 These should be drawn from “distinguished persons and 
persons from among ethnic and indigenous groups who fail 
to be represented as a result of elections … who have made 
significant contributions to national life”, Interim Constitution, 
Art. 63(3)(c). 
54 The first amendment to the Interim Constitution set up a 
Constituency Delimitation Commission to redraw boundaries 
and increase constituencies from the earlier 205. Interim 
Constitution, Arts. 63(3, 3A) and 154A). The list of revised 
constituencies is available (in Nepali only) at www.election. 
gov.np/NP/pdf/chhetra2063.pdf. 
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names.55 There are some 6,000 candidates on the lists of 
54 parties. Each party will select its winning 
candidates from any position on its list once the 
Election Commission announces how many seats it 
has won. (The fact that the numbered lists have been 
presented as if they are ranked may confuse or 
disappoint voters if the parties select names that were 
low on the lists.56) That number will be calculated by a 
system that slightly favours larger parties.57 
Parties must abide by certain quotas.58 Women must be 
at least half their PR list and at least half of those they 
select to fill PR seats they win; across both election 
contests, parties must field at least 33 per cent women 
candidates.59 This means that if women FPTP candidates 
are allotted losing seats, female delegates could make 
up less than 30 per cent of the CA. Other PR quotas 
include: Dalits, 13 per cent,60 “oppressed and indigenous”, 
37.8 per cent, “backward region”, 4 per cent,61 Madhesi, 
31.2 per cent and “others” (groups not mentioned 
elsewhere in the list) 30.2 per cent.62 These apply only 
 
 
55 The major parties have submitted lists with 335 candidates. 
All lists are at www.election.gov.np/reports/report/reportBody. 
php?selectedMenu=PR%20Party%20wise%20(Close%20List). 
56 Some parties, notably the CPN(M) and RJP, have carefully 
positioned all of their candidates from marginalised communities 
at the head of their lists but this is no guarantee that they will 
be selected to fill any seats won in the PR contest. 
57 On PR systems and the modified Sainte-Lague method to be 
used in Nepal’s election, see Hans Riedwyl and Jürg Steiner, 
“What is Proportionality Anyhow?”, Comparative Politics, vol. 
27, no. 3 (April 1995), pp. 357-369; and Arend Lijphart, 
Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-
Seven Democracies, 1945-1990 (Oxford, 1994). The Election 
Commission’s presentation on the system is at www.election. 
gov.np/EN/legal/PRcalculationEN.pps. 
58 These quotas, provided for by the Interim Constitution, are 
defined in the Election Act 2007, Schedule 1. The Procedures 
for Nomination and Selection of Candidates in Proportional 
Election, 2064 (2008) are available at www.nepalelectionportal. 
org/EN/election-laws/nomination.php. 
59 Interim Constitution, Art. 63(5). 
60 “Dalit” is the term “untouchables”, who are at the bottom of 
the traditional caste hierarchy, prefer to describe themselves. 
61 “Backward region” refers to eight western and far-western 
districts: Accham, Kalikot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, 
Mugu and Humla. 
62 Election Commission officials are unable to clarify the 
“others” category, Crisis Group interview, Laxman Bhattarai, 
commission spokesperson, Kathmandu, March 2008. According 
to the spirit of the Interim Constitution, “other groups” was 
supposed to mean other marginalised groups (for example, 
Muslims) not mentioned in individual quotas. However, the 
parties used this category for any group not covered by previous 
categories – including high caste and otherwise privileged 
communities. This has both reduced the originally intended 
scope of affirmative action and further complicated the post-
election arithmetic. Further explanation can be found at 
to the PR list (for both nominated and winning 
candidates), and the Election Commission may accept 
a 10 per cent variance in any category.63 The requirement 
to nominate half women applies to each quota (eg, 
there must be at least 6.5 per cent female Dalits). There 
are no quotas for the FPTP contest, but parties are to 
“take into account the principle of inclusiveness while 
nominating candidates”.64 At the polling booth voters 
will first be given a light blue FPTP ballot paper. 
Once they have marked their choice with a stamp, 
they will be issued a light pink PR ballot paper to be 
cast in a separate ballot box.65 
The result is a system that is hard to understand and may 
well not produce the proportional outcome activists want. 
An expert said, “this is a very complex electoral system 
– very few people, even supposed experts, understand 
it. The parties are now starting to realise how complicated 
it is. It’s not easy for them”.66 Many candidates reportedly 
do not understand it. Only one fringe party filed a correct 
initial PR list; all others were returned for revision, 
although some parties had only made minor technical 
errors.67 This type of PR list system has only been used 
by Serbia and Guyana, and has been widely criticised 
for its lack of transparency and voter accountability as it 
allows party leaders to select winning candidates.  
Critics also point out it is unlikely to deliver a 
proportional outcome. Parties winning a handful of PR 
seats will only be able to select a rough approximation 
of representative candidates; those winning an odd 
number of seats may well choose more men than 
women. The better smaller parties do, the less likely 
the overall balance will meet quotas.68 Furthermore, 
parties that field short lists for less than 30 per cent of 
PR seats (100 candidates or less) do not have to meet 
 
 
www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/elections-in-nepal/electoral-
system.php.  
63 The Election Commission will judge whether the PR 
nominees for winning seats meet the criteria and will demand 
revisions if they do not; the EC can allow +/- 10 per cent 
variance on each quota, Election Act, 7(8). 
64 Ibid, 5(3). 
65 One constituency (Kathmandu-1) will use an electronic voting 
system without ballot papers. See http://www.election.gov.np/ 
NP/evoting/EVM_FAQ.pdf. 
66 Crisis Group interview, international election observers, 
March 2008. 
67 Crisis Group interviews, Election Commission officials, 
Kathmandu, March 2008. 
68 Parties that win only one seat can disregard the quotas 
altogether and nominate whomever they choose from their list, 
Election Act, 7(14). 
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any quota other than that for women’s representation.69 
Of the 54 parties standing in the PR contest, only eleven 
will have to abide by the other quotas. 
The FPTP contest may also have deficiencies. Ballots 
will not have candidates’ names, just party symbols. 
Critics argue this undermines the nature of a contest in 
which there is a direct relationship between voters and 
individual candidates and representatives. Candidates 
from major parties should have little trouble getting 
voters to associate them with established party symbols, 
but smaller parties and independent candidates may 
struggle. An observer commented: “The system is crappy 
but that doesn’t necessarily mean the result will be”.70 
Others are not so optimistic. “This system is going to 
produce something that doesn’t even vaguely resemble 
PR”, an international expert said.71 Nevertheless, the 
combined quotas have produced a far more diverse field 
of candidates than ever before, and the CA will be 
significantly more inclusive than past parliaments. The 
guaranteed number of women members may fall below 
the one third some had hoped for but even around 25-30 
per cent will still put Nepal well ahead of other countries 
in the region – and probably around 35th globally for 
women’s representation. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE ELECTION 
COMMISSION 
The Election Commission, a powerful independent 
constitutional body, is solely responsible for the conduct 
of the polls.72 Headed by Chief Election Commissioner 
Bhoj Raj Pokharel, assisted by four commissioners,73 it 
runs the entire process, from compiling the voters list 
and preparing ballot papers to carrying out the elections, 
ensuring their security and managing the count and 
any initial complaints. It has issued regulations for the 
CA election and party registration and electoral roll 
rules, as well as an election code of conduct. The 
 
 
69 This was negotiated by the UDMF so that Madhesi parties 
do not have to field nationally representative candidates. See 
eight-point agreement, fn. 10. 
70 Crisis Group interview, international election observer, 8 
March 2008. 
71 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 9 March 2008. 
72 Interim Constitution, Art. 129(1). The Electoral Commission’s 
role and responsibilities are defined by ibid, Part 14 (Arts. 128-
130) and the Election Commission Act, 2063 (2007). In addition 
to national elections, the commission is also responsible for 
referendums and local government elections. The Interim 
Constitution Act is only available in Nepali, at www.election.gov 
.np/NP/pdf/ecact.pdf; the commission summarises its salient 
features in English at www.election.gov.np/EN/legal/ ecact.php. 
73 The other commissioners are Usha Nepal, Neel Kantha 
Uprety, Dolakh Bahadur Gurung and Ayodhi Prasad Yadav. 
commission has to coordinate closely with the home 
ministry and security forces and has deployed district 
election officers (DEOs) in all 75 districts. Total staff is 
around 240,000, and there will be between five and 
thirteen election officials and support staff at each of 
the nearly 21,000 booths.74 The commission has powers 
to second civil servants on election duties: on 14 March 
it sent 49 government secretaries to monitor preparations 
around the country.75 
How the commission referees the run-up to the polls, 
manages logistics and copes with the count and any 
appeals will be critical. Pokharel has won widespread 
respect for his professionalism and has asserted his 
authority in public warnings to the parties and government 
that he will not tolerate misbehaviour.76 He has also 
repeatedly urged the home ministry to work harder on 
security arrangements. However, he has so far refrained 
from exercising his power to fine parties or bar candidates 
(although one party was disqualified for failing to observe 
the women’s quota). The Election Commission is in an 
invidious position: lax enforcement may be taken as 
weakness, while strict enforcement could destabilise 
the peace process (hence its reluctant agreement to 
extend deadlines to accommodate fresh understandings 
with protestors). So far, Pokharel’s perceived closeness 
to the NC (he was an NC-appointed home secretary)77 
has not damaged his credibility; in fact, it may have 
helped him to convey tough messages to the NC and 
its ministers. But it could become an issue if he has to 
take a stance in party battles over procedures or results. 
C. THE PREPARATIONS 
1. Technical preparations 
The electoral roll. There are 17.6 million registered 
voters (out of a population of approximately 27 million 
and compared to 13.5 million in the 1999 general 
election).78 When the Election Commission completed 
compilation of the new voters list in May 2007, some 
 
 
74 Crisis Group interview, Laxman Bhattarai, Election 
Commission spokesperson, 14 March 2008. 
75 “Govt secretaries monitoring polls process from today”, 
ekantipur.com, 14 March 2008. 
76 For example, on 11 March 2008, the Pokharel summoned 
the cabinet and warned that if there was misbehaviour, he would 
disqualify candidates. 
77 Pokharel has served as secretary in several ministries but his 
longest tenure was in the home ministry (October 1992-March 
1995), to which he was appointed by the first post-1990 NC 
government. His first electoral experience was his association 
with the National Referendum Commission (1979-1980). 
78 For more information, see Election Commission statistics 
at www.election.gov.np/EN/prevelection.html. 
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individuals complained they had been omitted. Their 
complaints were resolved, and there have been none 
from parties about the overall accuracy of the list. 
However, many people have been left out. Only citizens 
who reached the age of eighteen by 15 November 2006 
were eligible to register, meaning the youngest voters 
on 10 April will be nineteen years and four months old. 
Permanent residents within an electoral constituency 
were registered as permanent voters; 79 others (including 
PLA combatants in cantonments and government 
employees – including soldiers, police and election 
officials) were registered as temporary voters, meaning 
they can vote only in the PR race.80 Internal migrants 
will only be able to vote if they return to their home 
constituencies (the Maoists had seized and burned some 
voters lists in February 2007 protesting the refusal to 
register migrants at their current addresses). Many 
recent citizenship certificate recipients, predominantly 
Madhesis, have also been left off the roll, although 
Madhesi parties have not raised this issue vocally. 
Ballot papers. Over 40 million ballots have been printed 
and have to be securely delivered to almost 10,000 polling 
centres. The printing was achieved on schedule, despite 
the tight deadlines, although distribution to more remote 
polling stations will be a challenge. Election officials 
have started distributing less sensitive basic materials 
separately; ballot papers will require transport and police 
guards.81 
Logistics. Collating the ballots, distributing them to the 
correct locations in time and keeping them secure will 
not be easy. Distribution and security in past elections 
were army responsibilities. Sceptical observers doubt 
that the Election Commission is up to the task. Preparations 
for recovery of ballot boxes and their secure delivery 
to count centres in the district headquarters may also 
be affected by this lack of experience. However, the 
commission insists the timetable is manageable, and 
district election offices appear to be well organised.82 
 
 
79 Electoral Roll Act, 5. 
80 The Election Commission will allow temporary voters to 
vote in the FPTP portion as well, if they can be present in their 
home constituency on polling day. “Nanimaiyalai kasle dela 
ta mat?”, Jana Aastha, 19 March 2007. 
81 Crisis Group interviews, election officials, Kabhre, Dolakha 
and Sindhupalchowk districts, March 2008. 
82 In the three district election offices visited by Crisis Group 
since the distribution of poll materials began (Kabhre, Dolakha 
and Sindhupalchowk), preparations were well in hand – although 
as these districts are close to Kathmandu and fairly accessible 
they are not necessarily representative. Election officials and 
returning officers had experienced no significant difficulties, 
political or technical, and were confident the polling could 
Staffing. There are two critical positions at the local 
level: the DEO, the commission appointee in charge 
of overall preparations, and the returning officer, who 
oversees polling and counting in each constituency. In 
districts with multiple constituencies, there will be a 
chief returning officer, who acts as returning officer in 
one constituency but also coordinates the other returning 
officers. Returning officers are drawn from the judiciary 
(although in past local elections, chief district officers 
have filled the role). Each polling centre will have a 
polling officer and as many assistants as necessary, 
drawn from the civil service or state corporations.83 
International assistance. Many donors have offered 
significant bilateral aid to prepare for the polls, and the UN 
Mission (UNMIN) is mandated to help create a suitable 
environment. The Electoral Commission is not allowed 
to accept cash but says it has received the equivalent of 
Rs.533 million ($8.4 million) as foreign aid in kind.84 
UNMIN’s mandate includes supporting the process with 
technical assistance. Its advisers have been working with 
the Election Commission in Kathmandu and five regional 
centres since the start of its mandate; it has now deployed 
advisers in all 75 districts. The UN has also set up an 
independent Electoral Expert Monitoring Team (EEMT), 
which reports directly to the Secretary-General.85 
2. Security arrangements 
Security arrangements are based on those for past 
elections but with some modifications. The most critical 
difference is that the army, which had previously been 
deployed for security back-up, will be confined to barracks 
under the terms of the CPA. The home ministry will deploy 
over 100,000 security personnel: 40,000 regular police (NP), 
22,000 armed police (APF) and some 48,000 temporary 
 
 
be managed effectively. Crisis Group interviews, Kabhre, 
Dolakha and Sindhupalchowk districts, 25-30 March 2008. 
83 The functions, duties and powers of the returning and polling 
officers are set out in the Election Act (10-14). The Election 
Commission summarises their roles at www.election.gov.np/ 
EN/legal/returning.php and www.election.gov.np/EN/legal/ 
polling.php. 
84 Election Commission statement, www.election.gov.np. 
85 UN Security Council Resolution 1740 (S/RES/1740, 23 
January 2007) specifies that UNMIN should “provide technical 
support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election 
of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere, in 
consultation with the parties” and that the EEMT should “review 
all technical aspects of the electoral process, and report on the 
conduct of the election”. On Resolution 1740, see Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
UNMIN’s support is explained in a factsheet, at www.unmin. 
org.np/downloads/publications/ Factsheet_3_ENG.pdf. 
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police and 6,000 temporary armed police.86 Effective 
policing is necessary not only to ensure a free and fair 
environment for campaigning but also to protect the 
physical integrity of ballots – from the moment they 
leave the press and are distributed to districts until 
completion of the final count. Given the likelihood of 
some repolling, the security exercise will extend over 
several weeks, perhaps even a few months. The 
recruitment of temporary police has been problematic: 
political parties have put forward their cadres, and many 
appear to have been enlisted. Even if partisan recruits 
can be weeded out, minimal training and preparation 
for coping with possible violence may well make the 
temporary forces counterproductive. 
Overall responsibility for security arrangements lies with 
the Central Security Committee, a permanent body headed 
by the home minister and including the NP and APF 
chiefs, home and defence secretaries (and, optionally, the 
chief election commissioner). The Election Commission is 
to work closely with the home ministry, which retains 
operational control over security personnel, although 
the commission can issue directives.87 At the district 
level, security forces will answer to the chief district 
officer, who chairs a district security committee bringing 
together the local security chiefs.88 This committee can 
also include the district election officer. Each polling 
centre will normally be guarded by between five and 
sixteen police. They will be greatly outnumbered by 
party representatives and supporters, but election officials 
hope that civil society, media and other observers will 
also act as a deterrent against election-related crime. Five 
helicopters will be on standby (one per region) for 
emergency evacuation or security force deployment.89 
Extra security has been provided for sensitive districts 
which are more likely to see disruption by armed groups. 
Each of the twelve constituencies in Siraha and Saptari 
districts will have three APF and two NP bases, with 
patrols across the area. Other Tarai districts will have 
two police bases; hill districts will have only one APF 
base each. Some candidates have been given personal 
 
 
86 The temporary police have been recruited and their two-
week training started in mid-March 2008. They will be retained 
for a month. Crisis Group interview, home ministry assistant 
spokesperson Ekmani Nepal, Kathmandu, 19 March 2008. 
87 Ibid. The Election Commission has broad powers to issue 
directives to all government personnel, Election Act (39, 45). 
88 This includes the senior commanders of the NP, AFP, army 
and NA and the National Department of Investigation, the 
domestic intelligence agency.  
89 Four private chartered helicopter and one army helicopter. A 
second army helicopter will be on standby for the Kathmandu 
valley. 
security on the basis of individual threat analyses.90 Other 
security measures will include sealing the border (for two 
to three days), banning the sale of alcohol, closing schools 
(for two weeks), and increasing army protection of borders 
and critical infrastructure (as permitted by the CPA).  
There are concerns over police neutrality. The NP has 
been historically biased towards the NC, which also holds 
the home ministry and so has operational control of all 
security forces. There is also concern over the ability of 
the APF, raised and trained as a counter-insurgency force, 
to adapt to the sensitivities of an election. Politicians 
from various parties have called for the army to be 
deployed, despite the CPA prohibition. The army itself 
has kept track of the security situation and has made 
plans in case it is called in to cope with severe instability.91 
It has deployed troops to 50 locations, such as airports 
and customs posts, to provide additional security – a 
move permitted by the CPA, although it did not give the 
requisite notification, reportedly due to lack of time.92 
3. Voter awareness 
Many observers have long expressed fears that voters are 
insufficiently aware of the CA election, or of its purpose 
and modalities. The most recent extensive survey 
concluded that “only a small proportion of people have 
heard about the issues raised by the political parties such 
as a federal state, proportional electoral system, etc. 
Likewise, only a small proportion understand what a 
constituent assembly is”.93 The lack of understanding 
this implies may be overstated: the definition of “correct” 
understanding is narrow, and the campaign and media 
attention will boost awareness.94 This has been a priority 
for government and non-government agencies. 
The Election Commission has taken the lead in 
organising basic voter education programs across the 
country. Its efforts have been supplemented by numerous 
 
 
90 Candidates are entitled to state security if they specifically 
request it or if police threat analysis suggests they require it. The 
local administration is the primary point of contact for candidates. 
91 Crisis Group interviews, senior army officers, January-
February 2008. 
92 See “Election Report No. 1”, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 22 March 
2008, at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/publications/2008-03-
22-UNMIN.Election.Report.1.ENG.pdf. 
93 Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, “Nepal 
Contemporary Political Situation V: Nationwide Opinion 
Survey”, Interdisciplinary Analysts, Kathmandu, March 2008, 
p. 67. Fieldwork carried out in December 2007 and early January 
2008 found that 67 per cent of respondents had heard of the 
CA but only 21 per cent correctly understood it. 
94 On an earlier survey in this series and the narrow definition 
of “correct” understanding, see Crisis Group Report, Towards a 
Lasting Peace, op. cit., p. 37, fn. 360. 
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NGO projects, mostly funded by donors. The 
commission’s work has included training thousands 
of local volunteer educators, publishing information 
booklets and posters and producing radio and television 
information slots.95 The scale has been impressive but 
the impact is hard to quantify. There has been criticism 
that volunteer educators were reluctant to reach beyond 
district headquarters; volunteers themselves reportedly 
found the electoral system hard to understand and 
even harder to explain.96 
NGOs have engaged in the effort in a number of ways, 
from running local workshops to publishing materials. 
Some have focused on particular issues, such as training 
for women journalists. However, there are concerns that 
generous donor funding directed to large Kathmandu-
based NGOs may not have met its targets, and there is 
little or no way of evaluating utility, impact and 
impartiality.97 Nepal’s media has matured and expanded 
rapidly since the 1999 elections. The greatly increased 
reach of FM radio and private television (as well as a 
flourishing print sector) has enabled the media to play 
a greater role in building awareness, and donor-funded 
NGO projects have boosted its capacity to disseminate 
CA information. Still, voters look primarily to the 
parties to educate them about the elections,98 and with 
campaigning underway, gaps in understanding may 
narrow rapidly. 
D. POSSIBLE ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE 
The Electoral Commission’s Code of Conduct is strict 
and Chief Commissioner Pokharel has said he will 
 
 
95 The Election Commission appointed some 8,500 volunteers, 
mostly school teachers, as voter educators. They were meant 
to travel to villages for 45 days disseminating information about 
the CA, encouraging participation and explaining how to vote. 
96 Crisis Group interviews, international and national election 
experts, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
97 Some Rs.180 million ($2.8 million) was channelled to NGOs 
registered with the Social Welfare Council, and they may have 
received more directly from INGOs. Only one recipient NGO 
was based outside Kathmandu. Bhadra Sharma, “Rs. 180M 
received from donors for voters’ education”, The Rising Nepal, 
8 March 2008. 
98 A nationwide survey (with 1,606 respondents) found that 28 
per cent of respondents looked to the parties when asked: “Who 
should conduct political awareness campaigns (such as providing 
information on constituent assembly election) in your locality?”; 
19 per cent looked to the media; only 9 per cent to NGO workers 
or civil society. Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Kumar Sen, 
“Drivers of Legitimacy: A Nationwide Survey Report”, 
submitted to The Asia Foundation and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), Interdisciplinary Analysts, 
Kathmandu, August 2007, chart 3.24. 
enforce it rigorously. Some of the commission’s steps 
seem excessive, such as banning motorcycle rallies to 
prevent “pomposity and ostentation”.99 Its inability to 
force parties to clean up their election graffiti suggests 
that aiming for perfection may be overly ambitious, 
especially if it means overturning long-established habits. 
Some forms of more serious electoral malpractice are 
also long-established habits – perfected and practised 
by the mainstream parties, which will likely use them 
against each other and the less experienced Maoists. 
Intimidation. The Maoists are justifiably seen as the 
primary problem, but other parties have often resorted 
to threats in past elections. All the major ones will use 
their youth and other wings for campaigning and a visible 
presence at polling booths which can keep an eye on 
other parties but may also intimidate voters or officials. 
The Maoists have announced they will deploy large 
numbers of Young Communist League (YCL) cadres at 
each polling station. The NC’s Tarun Dal (youth wing) 
and UML’s Democratic National Youth Organisation 
will also be out in force.100 
Voter impersonation, fraud. Although election identity 
cards were used in 1999, they are not needed for the 
CA polls. Voters can identify themselves with various 
documents, including citizenship card, passport, driving 
license or a government identification card with name 
and photo of the holder. This increases the risk of fraud. 
Parties will be tempted to make up for the absence 
overseas of many younger males by having others vote 
in their names. It will be hard for anyone to vote twice 
without official connivance, as fingers will be marked 
with indelible ink; however eighteen-year-olds excluded 
from the voters roll may well try to cast a ballot in 
another’s name. 
Booth-capturing. This refers to various forms of 
unauthorised seizure of a polling station to enable a 
party to stuff ballot boxes. Apart from direct, violent 
takeover – which has been tried in the past but would 
certainly lead to annulment and repolling – parties can 
seek to infiltrate their own permitted agents, “dummy” 
candidates’ agents and others inside the polling station 
to pressure officials to allow extra votes. Other tactics 
are even harder for observers to monitor: for example, 
a party might get its voters out early, then hold up the 
 
 
99 Press communiqué No. 2, Election Commission, 14 March 
2008, at www.election.gov.np/EN/detail_news.php?id=92. 
100 Tarun Dal President Mahendra Yadav said the party plans 
to mobilise 101 youths at each polling station “to secure each 
booth”; Democratic National Youth Organisation President 
Ajambar Kangdang said his cadres would “not remain mute 
spectators if anyone attempts to seize a polling booth”. Both 
parties’ student wings made similar statements. “Anyone can go 
to people: youth leaders”, The Kathmandu Post, 13 March 2008. 
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lines to cause delay and frustration among other voters. 
Given the short time available to process each voter 
through the two complex ballot-marking exercises, 
deliberate delay may be an effective, near-invisible tactic. 
Dummy candidates. Fielding dummy candidates (as 
independents) in individual constituencies can assist 
parties in various ways: the resources they are allowed 
to use for campaigning (cash and vehicles) can be 
diverted to the real candidate; they may divert some 
votes from rival parties; and, most importantly, their 
agents can be present at polling and at the count, 
pressuring voters and officials. Many suspected dummy 
candidates registered for certain seats, most egregiously 
Kathmandu-10, where the Maoist leader, Prachanda, is 
standing. A suspected seventeen Maoist dummies filed, 
but fifteen later withdrew.101 Other parties have been 
accused of the same practice.102 
Misuse of state resources. This will likely be a recurrent 
problem and cause for complaint from parties outside 
government.103 All 30 ministers are standing – twenty 
in FPTP seats, ten on PR lists.104 They will be tempted to 
divert resources to their parties and their own campaigns. 
The Election Commission has given warnings, but 
ministers do not seem to be listening. There have been 
repeated criticisms that the Maoists are abusing control 
of the information and communications ministry to use 
state media for propaganda.105 The NC, as leader of the 
government coalition and holder of key ministries, is 
in the strongest position to manipulate state resources. 
Lack of state neutrality. With the NC in charge of the 
home ministry, there is a widespread perception, 
 
 
101 “25 candidates withdraw names, 15 from constituency no. 
10”, ekantipur.com, 9 March 2008. 
102 For example, the NC and RJP appear to have fielded dummy 
candidates in Nuwakot district. “Yasta chhan ‘dami’ ummedavar”, 
Naya Patrika, 11 March 2008. 
103 The NC used government vehicles to go to the Election 
Commission to file candidate nominations. Observers report 
frequent and continuing misuse of government vehicles and 
other resources in many districts, Crisis Group interviews, 
international observers, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
104 “Tisaijana mantri chunavma”, Naya Patrika, 21 March 2008. 
105 Despite strong evidence, Minister Mahara says, “people say 
that but we haven’t even put our people into Radio Nepal – in 
fact, comrades keep complaining that they haven’t seen any 
benefits in my being in this ministry; there are still royalists 
and others in all the state outlets”, Crisis Group interview, 9 
March 2008. The Election Commission has kept up pressure: 
“Drawing the attention of the Government media, the Election 
Commission has again issued directives to the Chiefs of the 
Government media to comply with the CA Election Code of 
Conduct. The EC, time and again, has drawn the attention of the 
government media”, press release, 21 March 2008, at 
www.election.gov.np/EN/detail_news.php?id=99. 
including within the party’s own ranks, that it has 
disproportionate influence over local administration and 
policing.106 Apart from most senior bureaucrats, election 
returning officers are serving judges – drawn from a 
judiciary in which the public has little faith and whose 
senior members (mostly male and predominantly Bahun, 
a high caste) may have leanings to the major parties that 
have been in government when they were promoted.107 
E. ELECTION OBSERVATION 
Monitoring will be essential for endorsing the validity of 
the elections and as a deterrent to malpractice. Some 148 
Nepali and 29 international organisations have registered 
as election observers. Apart from registered monitors, 
party agents and officials, independent civil society 
members and journalists will be at many polling stations. 
National observers. An estimated 90,000 national 
observers from 148 organisations will monitor the polls. 
The Election Commission has accredited over 10,000 
observers at the central level; district offices will accredit 
the vast majority.108 National observers have to be adult 
Nepali citizens with at least tenth-grade education, non-
partisan and have received observation training from 
their organisation.109 There are five major observer 
networks: the Nepal Election Monitoring Alliance 
(NEMA), Nepal Election Observation Committee Nepal 
(NEOC-N), General Election Observation Committee 
(GEOC), Democracy and Election Alliance Nepal (DEAN) 
and Constituent Assembly Election Observation United 
Forum (CAEOUF). 
NEMA, funded by the Asia Foundation and led by 
Subodh Pyakurel, is probably the largest network, 
bringing together fourteen organisations and a significant 
membership.110 It has trained 17,000 volunteers and aims 
 
 
106 One report alleged Home Minister Sitaula has recruited 
over 600 Congress workers into the National Investigation 
Department, the domestic intelligence agency, since his April 
2006 appointment. He would be following the established 
practice of incumbents. “Anusandhan vibhag rajnitik 
bhartikendra”, Naya Patrika, 11 March 2008. 
107 The most comprehensive survey on social inclusion in 
Nepal notes that Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars hold “virtually 
all positions” in the judiciary, while women are even more 
poorly represented than in the civil service (where they are 
less than 1 per cent of first class officers and above). “Unequal 
Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal –
Summary”, DFID/World Bank, 2006, pp. 31-32. 
108 Crisis Group interview, Dhruba Dhakal, EC, 20 March 2008. 
109 Ibid. 
110 These include the Federation of Community Forest Users 
Nepal, Teachers Union of Nepal (a confederation of the UML- 
and NC-affiliated teachers organisations), Nepal Jaycees, 
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for 19,000, to cover all polling centres and issue an initial 
report by mid-morning on election day. DEAN, funded by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), will have 
13,000 observers from different organisations (to be 
trained by 556 veteran observers qualified as master 
trainers).111 CAEOUF, led by former Supreme Court 
Justice and IC drafter Laxman Aryal, plans to deploy 
5,000 observers. The Nepal Bar Association and NGO 
Federation will mobilise 1,000 and 2,000 observers 
respectively. 
The sheer numbers are impressive – almost 30 times 
more than in 1999 – although even the observers admit 
this may bring its own problems.112 Efforts to form a 
coordination committee have failed.113 Election observation 
has in the past been plagued by partisanship and there 
are no signs the CA polls will be different. Some major 
organisations and prominent individuals leading them are 
openly supportive of particular political parties.114 The 
Election Commission has indicated it will rescind the 
accreditation of observers who are found to be partisan; 
total numbers may end up significantly lower than the 
initial estimate. 
International observers. 29 international organisations 
have been granted accreditation, some of them 
Kathmandu-based embassies. They will field 810 
observers in total. The largest missions are those of the 
European Union (EU), the Asian Network For Free 
Elections (ANFREL) and the Carter Center. Some 
smaller missions are being organised by international 
organisations with an established Nepal presence, such as 
NDI and the Asia Foundation.115 Major international 
observers will compare notes, aiming not to directly 
contradict or undermine each other’s reports, but retain 
 
 
Private and Boarding Schools Organisation Nepal and National 
Federation of Irrigation Water Users Association Nepal. 
111 Nepal International Election Forum (NIEFO), Nepal Law 
Society (NLS) and Federation of Forestry Users Nepal 
(FECOFUN). NIEFO members have been involved in election 
missions abroad (usually UN-sponsored). NLS was involved 
with all three previous general elections. FECOFUN, a national 
federation of forest users with thousands of members nationally, 
is a NEMA member. DEAN’s publications, including monthly 
bulletins and background materials for national observers, 
are available at www.deannepal.org/publication.html. 
112 Crisis Group interview, NEMA chief Subodh Pyakurel, 
Kathmandu, 20 March 2008. 
113 Crisis Group interview, DEAN chief Subhadayak Shah, 
Kathmandu, 20 March 2008. 
114 For example, GEOC’s H.S.J.B. Rana is seen as linked to the 
NC and NEOC’s Surya Prasad Shrestha and NEOC-Nepal’s 
Sudip Pathak to the UML. 
115 Crisis Group has also registered as an election observer. 
their independence.116 The large EU mission need not 
reflect member state views; its leader stresses it will reach 
its own judgment independent of EU missions in 
Kathmandu or Brussels.117 Nevertheless, there is likely to 
be much common ground in the missions’ reports; if the 
polls are broadly free and fair, a united message would 
make it harder for parties to reject the results. Perfect 
compliance with international standards is probably 
impossible: as long as there is no outrageous violence 
benefiting the Maoists, India is likely to issue a prompt 
endorsement to forestall appeals and lock in the results. 
 
 
116 Crisis Group interviews, EU, ANFREL and Carter Center 
observers, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
117 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 18 March 2008. 
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IV. THE AFTERMATH 
A. REPOLLING 
Repolling will probably be necessary in some places, 
but it is hard to predict how many, and even election 
officials are unsure how it will be carried out. The 
returning officer of each constituency, or the polling 
officer at an individual station, has the authority to call 
off voting in a variety of circumstances. These include 
“any commotion as well as other extraordinary situation at 
the polling station or owing to non-operation of electronic 
devices or any riot or natural calamity or any act beyond 
control”.118 Any party that feels it is doing badly can 
easily cause enough disturbance to force a halt to 
voting. It is up to the returning officer to specify and 
publish a date for repolling. Polls can also be cancelled if 
ballot papers are lost, damaged or interfered with before 
the count, or if the counting station is seized.119 Repolling 
in any polling station means the count for the whole 
constituency must be suspended until it is complete.120 
Electoral law does not specify deadlines for repolling, and 
Election Commission officers admit they have no fixed 
plans.121 Some say it can be done almost immediately, but 
this is unrealistic. The ease or difficulty will depend on a 
number of factors. For example, if there was widespread 
violence it may take time to reestablish security and 
guarantee a free and fair environment. If most ballot 
papers were used before the poll was suspended, it may 
be necessary to print replacements, as polling stations 
will have only a small reserve on hand. Even supportive 
observers fear significant repolling may well be required. 
A senior Indian diplomat warned: “There may well be 
a few dozen places where repolling is necessary – it 
could be in effect an election in two phases”.122 
Election observers have urged that repolling regulations 
should be drawn up in advance to ensure that procedures 
are not politically influenced.123 As the decision to cancel 
 
 
118 Election to the Members of the Constituent Assembly Act, 
2064 (2007), 40(1). 
119 Ibid, 52 (1,2) and 53 (4,5). 
120 Ibid, 49(3). 
121 Crisis Group interviews, Election Commission officials, 
Kathmandu, March 2008. 
122 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, Kathmandu, 
14 March 2008. One quirk of the electoral legislation is that the 
government may choose different dates for polling in different 
constituencies, “taking into consideration the geographical 
situation, weather and other circumstances as well” but such 
staggered voting will still be deemed to have been held 
simultaneously. Election Act, 16(2). 
123 International observers and diplomats have made similar 
suggestions, Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
polling at individual stations on the day rests with polling 
or returning officers, there may be charges that they have 
not been impartial or acted under duress. 
B. THE COUNT 
Before counting starts, the ballot boxes from each booth 
are to be delivered under security escort to the relevant 
district headquarters. The returning officer must publish 
a notice specifying the place, date and time for the count 
so candidates and their agents can attend.124 FPTP and PR 
ballots are both to be counted in the district headquarters. 
If it cannot be done simultaneously, as preferred, the 
FPTP ballots take priority, and the PR count will start 
once that count is completed.125 Election officials are 
all likely to concentrate on completing the FPTP count 
first: managing two parallel counts will be practically 
unmanageable and there will be greater demand from 
voters and candidates to learn the FPTP outcome as 
soon as possible.126FPTP results will be published by 
each constituency returning officer as soon as they are 
ready. The PR tallies are meant to be passed to the 
Election Commission in Kathmandu, to be totalled 
centrally, but election officials have also decided to 
release the PR tally for each constituency when 
complete.127 
The Election Commission long maintained an overly 
optimistic estimate that the count would take seven to 
ten days, and a maximum of two weeks (assuming no 
repolling). Many international experts had suggested some 
three weeks (longer if repolling is required) will be 
needed.128 The Election Commission subsequently revised 
its projection to the end of April.129 Given the serious 
logistical constraints, this is a more realistic timeframe, 
although it will still almost certainly be extended by 
repolling. 
Individual FPTP results may start being announced 
shortly after election day.130 However, as the whole 
country is considered a single unit for the PR contest, 
those results can only be finalised when voting in every 
 
 
124 Election to the Members of the Constituent Assembly Act, 
2064 (2007), 48. 
125 Ibid, 49(1). 
126 Crisis Group interviews, central and district election 
officials, various districts, March 2008. 
127 Ibid, 57, 58. 
128 Crisis Group interviews, international election experts from 
several organisations, Kathmandu, February-March 2008. 
129 See “Results three weeks after polls, says EC”, Himalayan 
Times, 22 March 2008. 
130 In a case where an FPTP candidate stands and wins in two 
constituencies (a practice permitted in Nepal), he or she will 
choose which seat to resign and a by-election will fill the vacancy. 
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constituency is completed, and the final national tally 
has been confirmed. The parties will name the winners 
from their lists only after it has been announced how 
many seats they have. If their selections do not satisfy 
the inclusiveness quotas, they will be given three days 
to revise them.131 Although the rules allow for a 10 per 
cent variance, the provisions are so complex that parties 
may well fail – whether accidentally or deliberately – 
to meet the requirements. 
On past experience, some experts suggest 10 per cent of 
ballot boxes could be lost, damaged or interfered with 
before reaching counting stations. A similar percentage 
of ballot papers could be accidentally spoiled, although 
this is harder to predict. Voter awareness programs and 
the guidance of both officials and party agents at polling 
stations may reduce this. Still, the parallel system with 
double papers could confuse many voters, as could the 
55 party symbols. The lost or damaged ballots will 
probably not undermine the overall integrity of the 
vote, but since the margins separating parties could be 
narrow, 10 per cent disqualified ballots could prompt 
heated complaints and calls for repolling. 
The most important question is at what stage the Electoral 
Commission will feel able to declare final results. This 
is the trigger for convening the CA, but it is not clearly 
defined. Some may argue that as long as by-elections 
or repolling are pending, the results cannot be final. 
Others, happy with the broad picture, may push for a 
faster declaration. Failure to complete polling and 
counting in even a single station theoretically makes 
the PR announcement impossible, but it is unlikely 
the country will wait on a handful of trouble-spots. 
The decision on final results, like most other aspects 
of the election, is likely to be political. If it is made 
with the consensus of the major parties, there will be 
little quibbling; if not, there will be another dispute. 
C. THE RESULTS 
The complexity of the parallel system, the vagaries of 
voter behaviour, the weak tradition of opinion polling and 
the fluidity of the post-conflict political landscape all 
contribute to a situation that defies confident prediction. 
There has been little research on voter behaviour, and 
it is in any event uncertain whether old loyalties will 
outweigh more immediate concerns. The arrival of the 
Maoists as an untested electoral force may lead to shifts 
in support among leftist voters and beyond. Similarly, 
the new Madhesi parties’ prospects are hard to evaluate. 
The behaviour of first-time voters – some 22 per cent 
of the electorate – may reflect concerns specific to young 
 
 
131 Election Act, 7(10). 
people who have grown up in the democratic period 
and come of age during the conflict. 
Although it is unlikely any single party will win a 
majority, this does not mean the CA will be the same 
as a hung parliament. Assuming the broad division 
between the (more or less) republican left and the (more 
or less) conservative/royalist right continues, one of those 
blocs, however frail its cohesion, will have a majority. 
(This broad characterisation may be slightly complicated 
by the arrival of new parties.) The major established 
parties are banking on their voters turning out and hoping 
that loyalty and habit will trump the temptation to switch 
allegiance, particularly in the Tarai. The NC is hoping 
that the leftist vote will be split between the UML and 
the Maoists, potentially giving it an advantage in tight 
FPTP constituencies (just as the UML split before the 
1999 election brought it a landslide victory). However, the 
UML appears confident the Maoists will not eat into 
its votes – one reason why it has resisted an alliance. 
Royalist parties have been marginalised during the seven-
party-dominated transitional period but cannot be written 
off, especially if they can forge an alliance. Many 
prominent royalists have been confident enough to stand 
for election from their traditional FPTP constituencies, 
among them RPP, RJP and RPP (N) leaders.132 Together 
they could win PR votes not only from royalists but also 
from others dissatisfied with the current government; 
they will be able to draw on resources from well-off 
monarchists. The fact that the Maoists have risked 
condemnation by frequently obstructing royalist 
campaigning (even by parties that have supported the 
peace process) suggests they view them as a serious 
threat, as do their repeated calls for “nationalists” to 
leave the palace and join their cause. 
No configuration of results is without conflict risk. Any 
of the possible outcomes could aggravate tensions, and 
each would generate powerful losers. If two parties 
combined command more than two thirds of the CA 
seats, they could form an alliance powerful enough to 
drive through constitutional provisions. If, as is more 
likely, only three or more parties combined reach the two-
thirds mark, there will be a greater need for consensus 
and therefore a greater opening for smaller parties to 
stall progress. 
 
 
132 Eg, Pashupati Rana (Sindhupalchowk); Surya Bahadur Thapa 
(Dhankuta); Kamal Thapa (Makwanpur and Kathmandu-5). 
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D. REACTIONS: ACCEPTANCE, APPEAL OR 
REJECTION 
Several broad scenarios could emerge as results are 
announced. Ideally, a more or less free and fair process 
will leave some individuals complaining but the main 
parties accepting the outcome. More likely, there will be 
significant complaints from larger parties which cause 
some disruption and perhaps lead to repolling, but do not 
halt the entire exercise. In the worst case, one or more 
major parties could reject the election altogether and press 
for a re-run or simply take grievances to the streets. 
The critical test will be whether the election is credible 
enough for the results to withstand the complaints of 
powerful losers. There are several which could cause 
trouble if seriously dissatisfied with the conduct of the 
election or its results; any one of the main parties could 
obstruct progress. Meeting electoral standards is not just a 
matter of abstract principle: a credible process offers a 
much more solid basis for coping with post-poll complaints. 
The slow emergence of results and the order in which 
they are published (with individual FPTP results 
announced as soon as they are counted and the PR total 
probably weeks later) could have political significance. 
For example, the Maoists are widely expected to do 
badly in the FPTP contest. The announcement of 
initial poor results could lead to frustration among their 
cadres (possibly increasing pressure to reject the 
results) or embolden their opponents to goad them with 
premature political obituaries. The gradual publication 
of local PR tallies as the count continues and the 
circulation of rumours may well exacerbate a tense 
atmosphere.  
High popular aspirations raised by the polls – the prime 
minister has even promised they “will solve all the nation’s 
problems”133 – will not be met. Those whose hopes 
focus on greater inclusiveness may well be disappointed 
by initial FPTP results, which will be far less representative 
of gender, regional and ethnic diversity, and suspicious 
at delays in the PR results. International experts have 
urged that the Election Commission make greater efforts 
to inform voters about the time it may take to know 
results.134 While there will be many new faces in the 
CA, the probable victory of most senior politicians may 
give the impression of a return to business as usual. 
 
 
133 Prime Minister Koirala told the Nepal Donors Consultative 
Meeting: “The election will take place on April 10 and it will 
solve all problems facing the country”, “PM assures donors 
about timely polls”, nepalnews.com, 21 Feb 2008. 
134 The U.S. embassy has expressed willingness to fund such 
efforts, Crisis Group interviews, electoral experts and U.S. 
diplomats, Kathmandu, March 2008. 
Challenges and appeals are inevitable. Parties that see 
themselves as victims of intimidation or other unfair 
practices will register complaints. Individual parties and 
groupings could be unhappy for particular reasons: 
 CPN(M). The Maoists have frequently stated that 
as the people are on their side any result other than 
victory could only result from rigging. However, 
on other occasions their leaders have explicitly 
said they will recognise even unfavourable results.135 
The movement has remained on the fringes of 
the state and so will feel – however much their 
participation in government may point to the 
contrary – that they can justifiably denounce the 
elections as managed entirely by the “old regime”, 
from the election officials and security forces to 
the NC politicians who control critical ministries. 
The Maoists would find it hardest to accept an 
NC-royalist majority in the CA. 
 NC and UML. The two major parties of the 
democratic era make the most credible-sounding 
commitments to abide by the results. Nevertheless, 
surprisingly poor showings could prompt either to 
complain about an unfair environment or technical 
irregularities. Such complaints would be unlikely to 
go as far as all-out rejection and might be used as 
leverage in the bargaining over ministerial positions. 
 Madhesi parties. Madhesis will certainly be 
better represented in the CA than in any previous 
parliament, but it is possible many more will be 
elected on NC and UML tickets than from 
specifically Madhesi parties, whose disunity may 
cost them dear. This could prompt turmoil in the 
moderate Madhesi parties and strengthen the hand 
of more radical organisations, including armed 
groups. Even if divisions between Madhesi parties 
appear to be the main cause of a weak showing, 
the temptation to return to street protests to avoid 
being outflanked by radicals might be hard to 
resist. The only consolation that might suit 
individual leaders would be cabinet berths. 
 Royalists. The RPP and other royalist parties 
have been assiduously documenting Maoist 
obstruction and reporting incidents to the Election 
Commission, the press and the international 
community. None expects outstanding results, but 
none is likely to let any perceived unfairness pass 
without comment.  
 International reaction. The most influential (and 
probably most prompt) reaction to the polls and 
 
 
135 See, for example, “We will accept any outcomes of the CA 
polls: Prachanda”, ekantipur.com, 23 March 2008. 
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their results will be India’s. Although plenty of 
government agencies and opinion-formers in Delhi 
are still wary even of moderate parliamentary leftists 
such as the UML, India is likely to accept any 
result except one which would trigger a Maoist-led 
government.136 The U.S. would also balk at such 
a government, although both countries’ diplomats 
insist their concern is with the credibility of the 
process, not the results.137 Other countries worried 
by a strong Maoist showing would be shielded by 
India’s leading role in making objections (which 
could easily be based on the many violations likely 
before and on polling day). Conversely, if India 
accepts the outcome, others are highly unlikely to 
reject it. 
The Election Commission is the primary authority to 
handle complaints: it can annul the polls in any station 
or constituency.138 There is also a CA Court, which has 
the power to “hear and settle petitions relating to the 
election of members of the Constituent Assembly”.139 The 
court has a three-member bench, drawn from Supreme 
Court judges. Though in most respects it would follow 
summary trial procedures,140 any case might take a long 
time to process. Even once all evidence has been heard 
and the defence has submitted its statement (or the 
deadline to do so expires), it could take up to three months 
for the court to issue its verdict, which is final.141 The 
thoroughness of technical preparations and management 
will be critical for rebutting allegations of major fraud or 
other irregularities. Whether the Election Commission can 
resolve complaints or has to refer some to the court, 
political pressures will probably outweigh legal niceties. 
 
 
136 New Delhi’s concerns about a governing Maoist-UML 
alliance stem from fears the Maoists might become the dominant 
partner. India insists it would accept an outright Maoist victory 
achieved by free and fair means, Crisis Group interview, 
senior Indian diplomat, March 2008. But so relaxed a reaction 
in the event of that outcome would be unlikely. 
137 Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomats, Kathmandu, March 
2008. 
138 The Electoral Commission will investigate any complaint 
about a threat, intimidation or other inapporpriate influence 
on the polls. Election Commission Act, 17(1). It can annul the 
election in any consituency (or at any or all of its polling 
centres), if it decides that any election activities have not 
been free and fair, ibid, 17(2). Manual on Settlement of Petitions 
and Proceedings Relating to Election, 2064 (2007), at 
www.nepalelectionportal.org/EN/election-laws/settlement.php. 
139 Constituent Assembly Court Act, 2063 (2006), preamble and 
3(1). The constitutional provision establishing the court offers 
a marginally broader definition of its scope: “to examine 
election-related complaints”, Interim Constitution, Art. 118. 
140 Constituent Assembly Court Act, 2063 (2006), 10(1). 
141 Ibid, 14(1). 
V. A CHALLENGING TRANSITION 
A. A ROADMAP FOR THE INTERREGNUM? 
The transitional period will last at least several weeks. 
Even if voting goes smoothly, it will take at least three 
weeks for the final results to be published and up to 
another three weeks before the CA convenes. As noted, 
repolling will probably seriously extend that schedule. 
The Interim Constitution is vague on several transitional 
issues and avoids some altogether. Much depends on 
the major political players. While all the main ones talk 
of maintaining seven-party unity and consensus-based 
governance, there is no detailed agreement on how this 
would work. Even if there were a general commitment 
to seek a broad unity government, questions of its 
leadership and distribution of ministries would almost 
certainly be reopened in the light of election results. The 
seven parties will probably find it hard to admit others 
into their club (however fraught their relations, there is 
a certain comfort in the arrangement) but a stable unity 
government would need wider representation – of 
Madhesi parties, more representative individuals and 
perhaps moderate royalists. That will require a major 
psychological shift. 
The interim legislature will remain in place until it is 
automatically dissolved by convening of the CA.142 The 
Interim Constitution does not specify transitional 
arrangements for the executive but as long as the 
legislature is in place, the provisions for the continuity of 
the prime minister and council of ministers remain in 
force. This means there could only be a change in prime 
minister if the incumbent resigns, loses a no-confidence 
vote, ceases to be a member of the legislature or dies.143 
The Interim Constitution envisions formation of a new 
government after the CA convenes but only specifies 
that it should be broadly in line with its own provisions.144 
The critical ones that will likely still apply are that the 
prime minister should be selected by consensus or, failing 
that, elected by a two-thirds majority, and the council 
of ministers should be appointed by consensus.145 
“Consensus” is defined as that of the seven parties, 
 
 
142 Interim Constitution, Art. 45(4): “The term of the Legislature-
Parliament shall come to an end following the first meeting 
of the Constituent Assembly”. 
143 Ibid, Art. 38(7). A vote of no confidence is detailed in 
Art. 55A. 
144 “After the formation of the Constituent Assembly, the 
exercise of the executive power, constitution of the Council 
of Ministers and other matters related thereto shall, mutatis 
mutandis, be in accordance with the provisions in this Part”, 
ibid, Art. 44. 
145 Ibid, Art. 38(1-3). 
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which appear set to retain this privileged 
constitutional position regardless of the election 
outcome.146 
Prime Minister Koirala has said he will retire from 
politics after the election, but it is not clear if this is firm 
and, if so, when he will step down. His name remains 
on the NC’s PR list. If he resigns before the CA’s first 
sitting, his successor would be chosen by consensus or 
a two-thirds vote in the legislature. The Maoists, while 
supporting a coalition administration, said in their 
manifesto they would seek CA backing for an executive 
presidency and a new transitional government appointed 
by consensus.147 The UML said the government “will be 
formed under the leadership of the largest party on the 
basis of proportional representation”, implying that any 
party with sufficient seats could expect cabinet posts.148 
Other parties may see the start of the CA as an opportune 
moment to push for more structural changes. 
Managing the transition will be difficult. Even with basic 
cross-party consensus, the government has been weak 
in the pre-election period and may well be dysfunctional 
in its aftermath – especially if results suggest the power-
sharing arrangements require major changes. Tough 
decisions will be required during the interregnum, from 
managing election disputes to convening the CA and 
forming a new government. Perhaps more critically, 
the current government will have to manage security 
arrangements – and any post-poll instability could bring 
new calls for army deployment or other sensitive steps. 
B. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY’S FIRST 
SITTING 
The first sitting of the CA is to be summoned by the 
prime minister within 21 days after the Election 
Commission announces final results.149 Although the 
general understanding of “first meeting” is a single session 
on the first day, debate and procedural delays could 
extend it for several days.150 Its administrative tasks 
 
 
146 “For the purpose of this Constitution ‘political consensus’ 
means the political consensus reached between the seven 
political parties”, Interim Constitution, Art. 37(1), explanatory 
note. Formation of any new government shall be in accordance 
with this and other provisions, ibid, Art. 44. 
147 CPN(M) commitment paper, p. 19. 
148 UML manifesto, p. 38. 
149 Interim Constitution, Art. 69(1). 
150 The authoritative Nepali original uses the term baithak, in 
common usage “meeting” and in contrast with the standard 
term for “session” (adhiveshan). However, the terms are used 
more or less interchangeably at many points in the Interim 
Constitution, and occasionally baithak alone stands for 
“session” (eg, ibid, Art. 88(2)). One constitutional law expert 
include electing a chair and vice-chair, forming a new 
government and deciding basic rules of procedure 
(including how to divide its constitution-drafting and 
legislative functions). The Interim Constitution does not 
specify the order in which these decisions must be taken or 
a time-limit. Once formed, the cabinet is to nominate the 26 
remaining CA delegates by consensus, a process that could 
prove controversial if the assembly is closely divided.  
The Interim Constitution says, “implementation of the 
republic shall be made by the first meeting of the 
constituent assembly” but does not define “implementation” 
or specify a mechanism.151 The sitting of the CA is 
unlikely in itself to be considered an automatic trigger 
for implementation, which would presumably still be 
subject to a vote that the seven currently governing parties 
would feel bound in spirit, if not in letter, to support. 
The Interim Constitution had initially specified that the 
monarchy’s fate would be decided by simple majority 
vote at the first sitting, but this was altered to the language 
cited above, which leaves the need for, or nature of, any 
voting unspecified.152 The Maoists are the only party 
to offer a detailed description of what it understands 
by implementation of the federal democratic republic, 
although its elements range from the immediately practical 
(replacing the king with an interim president) to broader 
policy initiatives, such as immediate implementation of 
the CPN(M) transitional economic policy.153 The NC 
offers no clues in its manifesto and its leaders’ comments 
have been ambiguous.154 
If the NC and royalist parties do well, it would strengthen 
those pushing to reopen the question of the monarchy’s 
 
 
suggests that the “first meeting” may exclude an initial sitting 
to resolve procedural issues, Crisis Group interview, March 2008. 
There will be scope for debate over the word’s interpretation 
in the context of Art. 159(2). 
151 Ibid, Art. 159(2). This article was revised in the third 
amendment (28 December 2007) to reflect the 23-point 
agreement. 
152 Ibid, Art. 159(3) originally read: “Notwithstanding anything 
contained elsewhere in this Constitution, the Constituent 
Assembly shall decide by a simple majority at its first meeting 
about whether or not to continue the monarchy in existence”. 
153 CPN(M) commitment paper, p. 19. 
154 Prime Minister Koirala’s probable successor, Sher Bahadur 
Deuba, was deliberately vague when asked to describe the 
process in an interview: “Q. Take for instance, the issue of 
republic. Some say it will be implemented through the first 
sitting of the Constituent Assembly, while others disagree. 
What will happen? Deuba: Maybe it means the first session of 
the first meeting. It won’t be exactly like that; the issue of how 
to choose a president could take time. Q. How will the republic 
work? Will the king be ousted from the Narayanhiti [royal palace] 
or what? Deuba: What the king will do, stay in Nepal or leave 
the country, that is also unknown”, interview, ekantipur.com, 15 
March 2008. 
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future, either by voting against a republic or mounting 
a campaign for a referendum. The Maoists have already 
indicated in their manifesto that they see the CA as an 
opportunity to start from scratch – for example, by 
appointing an acting executive president. Assuming these 
hurdles can be crossed, the question of implementation 
will have to be addressed. If a republic is endorsed, the 
immediate future of the king and the appointment of a 
new head of state will need to be managed. Neither the 
Interim Constitution nor other written agreements address 
the modalities of implementing the republic, and these 
will certainly be contentious. 
C. POSSIBLE DESTABILISING FACTORS 
Two armies. Both the state and the Maoist armies are 
intact, as strong as ever and ready to fight if necessary. 
Indeed, the former has grown stronger with public 
rehabilitation of its reputation (helped by ineffective 
government and worsening public security) and 
recruitment to fill vacancies. It has also become bolder 
in its political interventions – most notably on Maoist 
integration and its public rejection of part of the eight-
point deal on Madhesi group entry into its ranks. Chief of 
Army Staff Rookmangad Katwal made pointed comments 
in his Army Day address about respecting the orders of 
any government “established by constitutional law”.155 
Unlike efforts to claim earlier remarks on Maoist integration 
had been misunderstood,156 he reinforced the message 
by having his official spokesperson reiterate the main 
points on the record the next day.157 On 20 March 2008, 
the army bluntly warned it would not tolerate any 
attempt to seize power by force or any elements that 
sought to compromise national sovereignty or territorial 
integrity.158 
Lack of progress on integrating PLA fighters, while seen 
by conservative opponents of the Maoists as a victory, is 
precisely what more militant Maoist commanders sought. 
 
 
155 “Sena divas 2064ko upalakshyama nepali senaka sakal 
darjalai pradhansenapatiko sandesh”, NA Headquarters, 6 March 
2008, paragraph 5, at www.nepalarmy.mil.np/news.php?news 
id=2173&& lan=np. 
156 See “No need to create wave out of my remarks: Army 
chief”, ekantipur.com, 13 January 2008. 
157 Army spokesperson Brigadier-General Ramindra Chhetri 
was quoted as saying: “Nowhere it is mentioned that Maoist 
combatants will be integrated into [the] NA. Politically active 
persons cannot be recruited into [the] army. Likewise, there 
cannot be collective recruitment based on some ethnic group or 
community”, “NA no to recruitment of politically indoctrinated”, 
nepalnews. 
com, 8 March 2008. 
158 “NA won't bow down at elements aiming to seize power 
forcefully”, nepalnews.com, 20 March 2008. 
Prachanda’s shift from December 2007 (when he was 
calling for integration before the elections) to January 
2008 (when he announced it could be deferred until 
after them) may look like a triumph for moderation but 
is in fact a concession to those who want the PLA to be 
intact on 11 April. PLA soldiers have been involved in 
election campaigning (some even standing as candidates); 
UNMIN believes some cantonments have permitted more 
than the maximum 12 per cent of combatants to leave 
at any one time.159 The progressive reassertion of the 
military on both sides is the most dangerous shortcoming 
of the peace process. The essence of the November 2006 
CPA was a commitment that both forces would be 
restrained, controlled by civilian politicians and stay 
out of politics to allow elections to go ahead. This has 
not happened: each has re-entrenched to protect its 
basic interests and remains combat-ready. 
Royalist rearguard action. Although most royalist 
parties have indicated they will accept the CA’s verdict 
on the monarchy, the king and his staunchest supporters 
may not be so accommodating. Their options are 
narrowing and pre- or post-poll disruption is one of the 
few avenues left to them to stall the process.160 The king 
has become slightly more vocal (giving two interviews 
after a long silence) but has made no public statement 
directly indicating an intent to oppose the CA. Some 
groups within the NC are more or less openly discussing 
options, including a call for return to the 1990 constitution. 
Former NC Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai has 
hosted meetings of the like-minded to discuss plans. The 
RPP(N) is still fighting for a referendum but is unlikely to 
attract significant support. Some people close to the king 
are still talking up the “democratic coup” plan, but the 
army is unlikely to step in without international backing 
and civilian, rather than royal, political cover.  
Royalists have frequently hinted at secret Indian 
guarantees of the monarchy’s survival, but the resolution 
of the Madhes movement suggested Delhi has decided not 
 
 
159 See “Election Report No. 1”, UNMIN, Kathmandu, 22 March 
2008, at www.unmin.org.np/downloads/publications/2008-03-
22-UNMIN.Election.Report.1.ENG.pdf. Unarmed PLA and NA 
soldiers in plain clothes can go out of  their cantonments or 
barracks on leave, for medical referral or to visit families – but 
no more than 12 per cent of the total personnel at any location 
may be absent at one time. “Agreement on Monitoring of the 
Management of Arms and Armies”, 8 December 2006, 
paragraph 5.2(5). 
160 See Kiran Nepal, “Antim ladain”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 28 
February 2008. This article quotes former royal minister Tanka 
Dhakal warning that elections will only be possible with the 
king on board and that there will be “great bloodshed” if 
Gyanendra is sidelined. 
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to offer the king an unconditional lifeline.161 Questioning 
the CA elections’ legitimacy, trying to use sympathetic 
legislators and stalling for time are the best but still weak 
options for the royalists. Opinion polls suggest a significant 
minority still supports some form of monarchy, but there 
are few ways to convert that abstract belief in the institution 
into a practical rescue plan.162 Still, the monarchy is 
unlikely to disappear without some final, possibly violent, 
confrontation. If the move to a republic is achieved with 
a less than overwhelming public mandate, royalists 
may still nurture hope of a return at some future date. 
Weak peace process. Seven-party unity has sometimes 
been little more than cosmetic, and the peace process 
has been characterised by multiple agreements never 
implemented. Critical CPA elements remain unaddressed, 
despite explicit commitments in the 23-point agreement 
to move them forward. Whatever the election outcome, 
the Maoists will be keen to retain as much extra-
parliamentary leverage as possible and are unlikely to 
dismantle all their parallel power structures. On 6 
February they announced reestablishment of their United 
Revolutionary People’s Council, raising new doubts 
over their commitment to dissolve those structures.163 
Militant Maoists or royalists are far from the only threat 
to peace. The experience of the Madhesi and ethnic 
movements demonstrates that radicalism can spring from 
different sources and rapidly assume a violent form. In the 
absence of a solid peace process that transforms the basic 
structure of the conflict, the idea that the CA will be a 
panacea is an illusion. Weak governance and poor law and 
order have dogged the run-up to the elections and will 
probably be an even more severe problem in the aftermath. 
 
 
161 In the wake of the 23-point agreement, endorsed by New 
Delhi, that called for a republic, royalists were still confident 
that India would rescue the king. Rabindranath Sharma, then 
leader of the aggressively pro-palace RPP (Nepal) party, said, 
“India has still left a place for monarchy. I think India is 
negotiating with the king”, interview, Spotlight, 28 December 
2007. The prime minister’s signature on the eight-point 
agreement with the UDMF in February 2008, which confirmed 
the commitment to a federal democratic republic, and the 
changed language of royalist leaders such as Surya Bahadur 
Thapa suggests hopes of an Indian bailout have receded., 
162 Royalists took heart from a survey that reported 49 per cent 
support for the monarchy, Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Kumar 
Sen, “Nepal Contemporary Political Situation V: Nationwide 
Opinion Survey”, Interdisciplinary Analysts, Kathmandu, March 
2008. Other research, such as a large April 2007 survey which 
found 59 per cent in favour of a republic, suggest support for 
the monarchy is dwindling. “State of Democracy in Nepal”, 
International IDEA, June 2007, at www.idea.int/asia_pacific 
/nepal/upload/nepal_survey_keyfindings07.pdf. 
163 Press statement, United Revolutionary People’s Council, 
Kathmandu, 6 February 2008. 
VI. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND 
BEYOND 
A. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUENT 
ASSEMBLY 
The CA is a sovereign body and will be at liberty to 
define many of its own rules of conduct.164 In theory, it 
will be free to endorse or overturn any agreements entered 
into by the current government or its constituent parties. 
It will also be able to amend the Interim Constitution 
by a two-thirds vote.165 The CA’s goal is not specifically 
defined, although the preamble to the CPA and the 
Interim Constitution contain statements of intent that 
serve as non-binding guidelines.166 Broad public 
agreement on core governance principles has been 
reflected in the stated aims of the major parties, although 
their manifestos differ in approach. 
Procedures. The Interim Constitution establishes an 
unusual decision-making system. Apart from the question 
of the monarchy, all provisions are expected to be 
adopted unanimously, with time-consuming procedures 
for fresh consultations and voting if there is even one 
opposing vote. Each provision will be voted on in 
sequence and adopted if a quorum of two thirds is in 
attendance and no opposing vote is cast.167 Failing this, 
it will be referred to consultation between parliamentary 
party leaders before a fresh vote within 21 days and, 
failing unanimity, a further, final two-thirds majority 
 
 
164 For the constitutional provisions on the CA, see Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit. The 
UNDP’s CASU has made resources and reports available at 
www.undp.org.np/constitutionbuilding/. The report of a 3-4 
March 2007 conference is particularly useful: “Constitution 
Making in Nepal”, UNDP, Kathmandu, 2007, at www.undp. 
org.np/constitutionbuilding/elibrary/constitutionnepal/First%2
0Report%20Full%20English.pdf. 
165 The Interim Constitution permits the legislature-parliament 
to amend the constitution in this way (Art. 148) and states that 
the CA shall exercise the same powers once it replaces the 
interim legislature (Art. 59). 
166 The CPA’s preamble lists the tasks of the new constitution: 
“progressive restructuring of the state”; resolution of “problems 
related with class, ethnicity, regional and gender differences”; 
and principles of “competitive multiparty democratic system, 
civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, complete press 
freedom, rule of law and all other norms and values of democratic 
system”. The Interim Constitution echoes this list but does not 
require that the eventual constitution must be in accord with it. 
See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. 
cit., p. 10. 
167 Interim Constitution, Art. 70(1)-(2). It is unclear from the 
text what happens if members abstain. 
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vote.168 Separately, an absolute two-thirds majority can 
refer to a referendum “a decision on any matters of 
national importance, except when this conflicts with 
provisions elsewhere in the constitution”.169 This has been 
taken to exclude a referendum on the monarchy; although 
the Interim Constitution no longer specifies requirements 
for a vote on the monarchy, its unambiguous provision 
for immediate implementation of a republic presumably 
counts as a provision that rules out a referendum.170 
The structural bias towards unanimous decisions may 
encourage consensus building but will also allow 
individuals to stall progress. The role assigned to party 
leaders may well encourage backroom horse-trading 
instead of open debate. The lack of a provision for agenda 
setting, drafting and ordering of votes could further 
empower political leaders over legislators. The CA is 
entitled to set up such committees as it deems necessary 
and could either request additional secretariat support 
or delegate drafting to cross-party committees.171 
Negotiations over structures could be complex if parties 
see partisan advantage in specific mechanisms. However, 
faith in the process will be strengthened if committees 
or other structures function transparently and make drafts 
available to the public as they are submitted for debate. 
The CA as legislature. The CA’s dual function saves 
costs and electoral complications but raises the risk of 
trade-offs between its constitution-making and legislative 
functions. It is for the CA itself to decide how it wishes 
to divide its roles. The Interim Constitution states that 
the CA acts as the legislature as long as it is in existence 
but that it may delegate legislative duties to a separate 
committee.172 In any case, bargaining over day-to-day 
legislation could lead to party deals to gain support for 
constitutional provisions. Restricting the CA’s legislative 
mandate (either by constitutional provision or party 
commitments to avoid enacting all but essential 
legislation) could prevent some of these problems. 
However, as even the unelected interim legislature 
demonstrated an appetite for legislating across the board, 
it is unlikely that any proposal to limit legislative scope 
would win party backing in the CA. Transparency of 
procedures and debates, coupled with public participation 
in constitutional discussions, are the best remaining 
 
 
168 Ibid, Art. 70 (3-6). 
169 Ibid, Art. 157. 
170 Of course, the scope for referendums could be redefined by 
constitutional amendment. 
171 Parties have proposed certain mechanisms. For example, the 
NC envisages a main constitution drafting committee assisted 
by subject-specific expert committees or sub-committees. NC 
manifesto, p. 30. 
172 Interim Constitution, Art. 83(1). 
bulwarks against the CA falling victim to disputes over 
relatively minor legislation. 
Duration. The Interim Constitution gives the CA two 
years to complete its work, with a possible six-month 
extension in case of a “declaration of an emergency 
situation”.173 This is a reasonable timeframe, but the 
consistent track record of missed deadlines in the peace 
process suggests delays are entirely possible. The Interim 
Constitution specifies the need to use emergency powers 
to enable an extension but, as in other areas, the CA 
could decide that as a sovereign body, it is entitled to 
extend its timeframe by other means. Perhaps more 
worrying is the provision for early dissolution of the 
CA (by its own resolution),174 which could lead to 
suspension of the constitutional process mid-way without 
any framework for continuing executive, legislative 
or constitution-drafting functions. 
Implementation. It may seem premature to worry 
about how to implement a constitution the drafting of 
which has not yet begun. However, constitutional experts 
stress that implementation is increasingly recognised as 
the most important part of the constitutional process. 
Without viable plans to put it into practice, even the 
best document may fail to achieve its aims.175 
B. THE BIG ISSUES 
Although much attention has been focused on the 
monarch’s future, several other major issues are likely 
to generate serious debate: 
Security sector reform. Despite its centrality to 
ending the conflict and building a sustainable peace, 
the shape of Nepal’s security sector is yet to be 
discussed. There are only cursory, poorly defined 
commitments in the CPA (to make the army more 
representative and subject to democratic control and 
to “integrate” Maoist combatants). The committee 
that was supposed to take discussion forward has met 
only once and made no progress. 
Federalism. This will cause much debate. All major 
parties – even the RPP(N) – have formally accepted some 
form of federalism but there has been little discussion 
within them on principles or practicalities. There remains 
wide opposition across the political spectrum, including 
from prominent opinion-formers in academia, media 
and civil society. Little attention has been paid to the 
 
 
173 Ibid, Art. 64. 
174 Ibid, Art. 64. 
175 See “Constitution Making in Nepal”, UNDP, Kathmandu, 
2007, p. 23. 
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bureaucracy needed to support federal governance or a 
complex system of quotas and reservations. Related to 
federalism but not synonymous with it is the longstanding 
demand for more decentralisation. The 1999 Local Self-
Governance Act, which devolved some budgetary 
authority to Village Development Committees (VDCs), the 
lowest level of local government, was widely seen as 
a success but the dissolution of local elected bodies in 
2002 and the displacement of most VDC secretaries 
during the conflict (and latterly the Madhes unrest) 
halted progress. 
Secularism and inclusiveness. Parliament proclaimed 
Nepal a secular state in May 2006. All major parties are 
committed to endorsing this in the constitution, but it is 
an emotional issue that has already generated some 
passionate opposition, as well as criticism from Indian 
Hindu groups and parties. The CA may restart debate. 
The question of reservations, quotas or other forms of 
affirmative action will be hard fought. While the quotas 
in the CA electoral system may be seen as a precedent, 
there is unlikely to be easy agreement on whether the 
constitution should guarantee specific measures or 
contain only a general provision for later legislation to 
implement.176 
Government structure and state institutions. The 
Maoists call for an executive presidency with a prime 
minister elected by parliament to oversee day-to-day 
administration. The UML wants a weak, ceremonial 
presidency with a directly elected executive prime 
minister. Some parties talk of making the state more 
representative, accessible and accountable. The Maoists, 
for example, seek to overhaul the judicial system and 
bureaucracy. 
International relations. The Maoists have called for 
revoking the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with 
India, as well as tighter controls on foreign capital. 
International treaties or other agreements involving 
major natural resource issues are already subject to 
certain restrictions,177 and some may push for even 
stricter constitutional provisions, especially in the 
light of pre-election awards of large hydropower 
 
 
176 The 1990 Constitution specifically authorised “special 
provisions … for the protection and advancement of the interests 
of women, children, the aged or those who are physically or 
mentally incapacitated or those who belong to a class which is 
economically, socially or educationally backward”, Art. 11(3). 
However, no legislation was introduced to establish such 
provisions. 
177 Ratifying, acceding to, accepting or approving such treaties 
or agreements requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, 
Interim Constitution, Art. 156(2). 
contracts.178 Apart from this, the major parties’ stances 
on foreign relations are similarly bland. The NC and UML 
manifestos are indistinguishable in their commitment to 
base foreign policy on the UN Charter and panchsheel, 
the doctrine of non-interference.179 All parties promise to 
maintain good relations with India and China; the Maoist 
proposal that Nepal should be a “bridge” between them 
to take advantage of their fast-growing economies echoes 
King Gyanendra’s priority following his 2005 coup.180 
C. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
A meaningful process will require much better 
mechanisms for public consultation and participation 
than in the past. There has been no shortage of advice 
on how to accomplish this, ranging from a full-fledged 
constitutional commission (an idea unpopular with 
political leaders) to support structures to manage public 
discussions, invite and analyse individual or group 
suggestions and maintain transparent debate.181 
The major parties, however, show little interest in public 
consultation, despite the strong evidence that a more 
participatory drafting process on the Interim Constitution 
and firmer commitments to a similar CA exercise might 
have headed off some of the street agitations that forced 
pre-CA deals on key issues. The UML does not mention 
public participation in its manifesto; the Maoists make a 
single-sentence promise to adopt “appropriate mechanisms” 
to guarantee the active participation of “the general 
population, different interest groups and experts”.182 
The NC gives it more space and has more concrete 
proposals for public hearings and consultations with a 
variety of groups, as well as for CA committees to consult 
interest groups and experts on particular issues.183 
 
 
178 For example, the 2 March 2008 award of the 402MW Arun 
III hydropower project to India’s Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam raised 
controversy. Nevertheless, the CPN(M) is sticking with the 
two-thirds ratification rule, insisting only that it be 
rigorously enforced, commitment paper, p. 18. 
179 NC manifesto, pp. 19-20. UML manifesto, pp. 37-38. 
180 See July 2005 budget speech, at www.mof.gov.np/publication 
/speech/2005/pdf/BudgetSpeech_english.pdf. 
181 The UNDP’s CASU has offered significant support and 
guidance on possible mechanisms for public participation. See, 
for example, Yash Ghai, “A participatory process for making 
a new constitution”, CASU paper, at www.undp.org.np/constit 
utionbuilding/elibrary/constitutionnepal/Participatory%20pro
cess%20English.pdf. 
182 CPN(M) Commitment Paper, p. 16. 
183 NC manifesto, p. 30. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Even a successful election will only mark the opening 
of the next stage in the peace process. Many of the most 
critical tasks have been left on the back burner as 
attention has focused on the election. Surviving the 
rocky road to the polls and their probably turbulent 
aftermath will require maturity, cooperation and forward 
planning from the main parties. A managed transition to 
the CA is possible but the range of potentially disruptive 
factors is daunting. The parties’ first commitment must 
be to respect the election’s outcome, as long as it is 
broadly free and fair. Whatever the results, seven-party 
cohesion would smooth the way forward, but leaders will 
need to prepare for a broader unity government that 
includes other parties that do well at the polls. Tackling 
the sensitive remaining parts of the peace deal will then 
be a priority – starting with grasping the nettle of security 
sector reform and converting the extended military 
ceasefire into structural support for sustainable peace. 
Progress on security, justice, reconstruction and economic 
development would help to maintain popular support 
for the constitutional process. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 2 April 2008 
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APF Armed Police Force 
CA Constituent Assembly 
CDO Chief District Officer 
CEC Chief Election Commissioner 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
DEA District Election Adviser 
DEO District Election Officer 
EC Election Commission 
EEMT Electoral Expert Monitoring Team 
EOM Election Observation Mission 
FPTP First Past The Post 
FRNF Federal Republican National Front 
IC Interim Constitution 
JTMM Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (in two factions: Jwala Singh (JS) and Goit (G)) 
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum 
NA Nepal Army 
NC Nepali Congress 
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants Party 
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist) 
PR Proportional Representation 
RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party 
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party 
RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal) 
SPA Seven-Party Alliance (includes NC, UML, NSP(A), NC(D), Janamorcha Nepal, NWPP and ULF) 
TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party 
UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front 
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UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 
YCL Young Communist League 
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on the state of play in all the most significant situations of 
conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign 
ministries and international organisations and made available 
simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. 
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analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. 
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